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ABSTRACT 
 
Production labeling is a common approach for differentiating otherwise similar 
products in the marketplace.  While these labels may convey positive messages to 
consumers about the new product, they may simultaneously stigmatize the 
conventionally-produced product by highlighting perceived problems.  The net 
economic result for producers can be negative since consumers may decrease their 
willingness to pay for the conventional product that dominates the market, while the 
new product has a relatively small market share.  This research identifies this stigma 
effect in the case of milk, where the introduction of rBST-Free and organic milk 
reduces consumers’ willingness to purchase conventional milk. 
 In this thesis, the question of whether production labeling is driving 
consumer’s bias against conventional milk is investigated in an experimental setting 
by eliciting the willingness to pay in a sample of Cornell University staff and graduate 
students for milk produced via different production methods and of varying fat 
contents.  Through altering the order in which participants bid for the different types 
of milk and analyzing the resulting data using a two-limit random-effect Tobit model 
with instrumental variables, we find that consumers are indeed willing to pay a 
premium for rBST-Free and organic milk despite a lack of scientific evidence 
regarding harmful effects of rBST on human health. 
The results illustrate that, by varying the order in which experiment 
participants were allowed to taste and learn information about milk produced using 
different techniques, we are able to demonstrate that participants were willing to pay 
less for milk produced using rBST after being exposed to rBST-Free and organic milk, 
and likewise, willing to pay more for rBST-Free and organic milk after being exposed 
to milk produced using rBST.  In a situation where milk produced using all three 
techniques is available,  the end result is a higher price charged for rBST-Free and 
organic milk and decreased revenue for farmers and distributors who deal in milk 
produced using hormones.  The implications of the experiment are fairly 
straightforward – production labeling can indeed be a strong influence on consumer’s 
perception of a good, and producers of conventional goods in markets where 
alternative products are being introduced need to be aware of the potential impact of 
the availability of the new product on the demand for the conventional product.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Ideally, the labeling of products based on the production methods used should improve 
consumers’ welfare by offering more choices, while at the same time allow producers 
to differentiate their products and potentially secure additional profits from consumers 
who are willing to pay (WTP) more for a commodity produced with “preferable” 
methods.  However, labeling to promote the benefits of one technique may also cast 
the conventional commodity in a negative light.  For example, some dairy industry 
officials are troubled by the labeling of some milk as free of recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST), which is a synthetically produced version of the naturally 
occurring hormone bovine somatotropin (bST).  Dairy farmers use rBST to boost the 
milk yields of their dairy cows.  Some industry officials believe that labeling some 
milk products as “hormone free” will stigmatize conventionally produced milk 
resulting in a reduction in conventional milk or perhaps total fluid milk consumption.1  
In fact, several states have considered or are considering bans on milk labels that 
include phrases such as “hormone free” or “contains no artificial hormones” because 
of the potential stigma effect (Martin 2007). 
   In ex ante studies of the impact of rBST on consumers’ milk purchasing 
behavior, several factors were found that reduced the demand for milk produced by 
cows treated with rBST, including the amount of information about rBST that 
consumers possessed, the quantity of milk they consumed, and how much they were 
concerned with the level of milk prices (Kaiser, Scherer, and Barbano 1992).  This 
                                                 
1 In this article, conventional milk refers to the majority of milk sold in the marketplace, which is 
unlabeled and may or may not have been produced with rBST.  All organic milk and rbST-Free milk 
comes from farmers that pledge not to administer rbST to their cows 
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study confirms that, despite assurances from the Food and Drug Administration with 
respect to the safety of rBST for human consumption, consumers are not convinced 
that the use of rBST in the general fluid milk supply is in their best interests. 
 The question of the desirability of rBST for consumers has become even more 
relevant as large fluid milk processors and retailers, including Wal-Mart, Kroger, 
Dean Foods, and Starbucks have begun requiring suppliers to cease the use of rBST on 
their dairy herds.  Whether this decision was made with the interests of consumers in 
mind, or for some other reason, remains unclear.  What is clear, however, is 
consumers are moving away from purchasing conventionally produced milk and 
towards alternative products that are viewed as safer and more attractive, mainly 
organic milk and rBST-free milk. 
 A shift in consumers’ preferences away from conventional milk, which may or 
may not contain rBST, towards rBST-free alternatives is likely to have a significant 
impact on fluid milk producers. Estimates of rBST adoption rates in the United States 
vary significantly—from 15% in Wisconsin herds to as high as 44% in New York and 
Texas herds (Barham et al. 2004). According to Monsanto, the largest producer of 
rBST, 17% of dairy farmers nationwide used rBST to some degree on their herds and 
their herds accounted for 33% of the total number of dairy cows in the U.S. If fluid 
milk retailers and processors continue to push farmers to stop using rBST on their 
herds, there will likely be significant costs to the farmers as they transition back to 
dairy production techniques that do not utilize rBST (Forbes 2008). 
 In this research, the potential bias of consumers towards conventional milk is 
examined in the context of stigma, a psychological phenomenon in which an object 
becomes viewed in a negative manner even when no actual problem or health risk has 
been identified.  The problem is addressed using experimental economics and eliciting 
WTP for fluid milk produced via differing production methods and varying fat 
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contents from adult subjects. Through altering the order in which participants bid for 
the different types of milk, we find that consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
organic and/or rBST-free milk despite a lack of scientific evidence regarding harmful 
effects of conventional milk on human health, and hence it is likely that the trend 
towards rBST-free milk products is being driven by consumer preferences.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
Early research involving rBST was mainly concerned with how milk production 
would increase due to rBST adoption and the resulting implications for dairy policy 
(see, for example, Fallert et al. (1987); McGuckin and Ghosh (1989); and Tauer and 
Kaiser (1991)). While the supply-side effects of the introduction of rBST into dairy 
herds were well documented, the effects of introducing an unfamiliar biotechnology 
into a familiar good, were less well known.  A limited number of studies were done to 
gauge how consumers would react to the presence of rBST in their milk.  In a survey 
of consumers in New York and Virginia, 33% and 20 % of consumers, respectively, 
were concerned about the safety of rBST in their milk, and only 30% and 35%, 
respectively, believed that milk supplemented with rBST was safe to drink (McGuirk 
and Kaiser 1991).  Additionally, 85% of the respondents in both states believed that 
milk containing rBST should be labeled as such, the implication being that they were 
not fully convinced of the safety of rBST and would like the option of avoiding milk 
containing it if they so chose. Another study of consumer opinions regarding rBST 
found that, even taking into account reduced prices from rBST-induced milk 
production expansion, there would likely be a 1.6% decrease in milk consumption 
after the introduction of rBST (Kaiser, Scherer, and Barbano 1992). 
 The introduction of organic milk is the closest parallel to that of rBST-free 
milk.  While there has been much economic research on organic milk, little has been 
done on its potential stigma effect on conventional milk.  However, there has been 
some research regarding premiums that consumers are willing to pay for organic milk.  
Using scanner data and a hedonic econometric model, Bernard and Mathios (2005) 
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found that consumers were willing to pay premiums for both organic ($0.73 per 
gallon) and rBST-free ($0.26 per gallon) milk.  The higher price premium for organic 
milk implies that consumers are willing to pay more for the additional attributes that 
correspond with organic production.  Bernard and Bernard (in press) used 
experimental price auctions to decompose consumers’ WTP for various attributes of 
organic milk, with an emphasis on the rBST-free and the no antibiotic characteristics. 
They found that consumers place a significant value on both the rBST-free and the no 
antibiotics attributes of organic milk.  Dhar and Foltz (2005) used supermarket scanner 
data and a quadratic almost ideal demand systems model to examine the value 
consumers place on having organic and rBST-free milk in the market place in addition 
to conventional milk.  The authors found substantial benefits to consumers ($2.53 
billion) in terms of “competitive” and “variety” effects of having these two products in 
the market.  Based on previous research, therefore, it appears that consumers:  (1) 
prefer having a market that offers choice among conventional, organic, and rBST-free 
milk, and (2) are willing to pay significant premiums for organic milk, and somewhat 
smaller premiums for rBST-free milk compared with conventional milk.  Consumers’ 
reluctance to embrace rBST as a beneficial technology, as well as the presence of 
conflicting information regarding the safety of rBST in milk, also bears many 
similarities to consumers’ reactions to the use of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) and other biotechnology in food production (e.g., Noussair, Robin, and 
Ruffieux 2004; and Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroder 2004).  
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2.1 Stigma and its Influence on Consumer’s 
Perception of rBST-Free Milk 
 
It seems that consumers’ biases against GMO and rBST share many attributes. The 
question is why the bias against rBST persists. There is a plethora of information 
available regarding the safety of rBST and much of it is conflicting. A study of 
decision-making based on divergent risk information found that decision makers will 
put more weight on high-risk information than on low-risk information (Viscusi 
1997). Another study by Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002) on consumers’ reactions to 
food irradiation came to a similar conclusion-- consumers’ WTP for irradiated pork 
decreased more after exposure to negative information than it increased from exposure 
to positive information regarding the pork. Additionally, it seems that consumers are 
not adept at assessing food risks. In an experimental study of consumers’ WTP for 
increased food safety, participants were likely to rely more on personal experience 
than scientific information when determining their values for avoiding illness (Hayes 
et al. 1995). This could very well be occurring in the case of rBST. With the ease of 
acquiring information from the internet, it can be difficult for potential milk 
consumers to separate reliable information about rBST and human health risks from 
less reliable sources, especially since Canada, Japan, and a number of countries in 
Europe currently ban the use of rBST entirely. In a situation such as this, where there 
is conflicting risk information, consumers may put more weight on the high-risk 
information (or existing personal beliefs) than on the more reliable low-risk 
information and adjust their purchasing behavior accordingly.  
A topic related to the emphasis on high-risk information is the concept of 
stigma. Stigma can be thought of as “a negative feature that typically pervades and 
dominates an otherwise acceptable entity” (Rozin 2004). Stigma is passed on via 
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direct contact with a contaminated object in a phenomenon known as contagion 
(Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff 1986). Another key element of stigma, at least in 
Western societies, is that people tend to describe their feelings of revulsion for a 
stigmatized object in terms of how it impacts their health (as opposed to an object 
possessing some innate evil characteristic). The effects of stigma have been observed 
in a variety of economic situations such as the large decrease in home values near 
some toxic waste sites where the actual health risk posed by these sites in many cases 
has been relatively small and therefore objective risk alone cannot explain the 
consumer response (Messer et al. 2006; Dale et al. 1999; Adams and Cantor 2001; 
Guntermann 1995). Other examples of stigmatized products include cyanide in 
Tylenol bottles, exploding gas tanks that plagued the Ford Pinto, Firestone tire failures 
on the Ford Explorer, and mad cow disease with beef. 
Regarding the possible stigmatization of conventional milk by organic and 
rBST-free milk, the properties of contagion and medicalization of risk are especially 
salient.  Milk is considered a healthy, desirable food to consume until the milk 
undergoes contact with rBST via contagion, despite the lack of substantial chemical 
change in the milk.  People who see the addition of rBST to cows producing milk as a 
negative action tend to cite possible negative health consequences to humans and cows 
as justification for their views.  Both of these properties play into the possible role of 
production labeling in stigmatizing conventionally produced milk.  By distinguishing 
between conventionally produced and rBST-free milk through the use of labeling, 
milk retailers can potentially tap into consumers’ fears regarding the safety of 
conventionally produced milk in order to charge higher prices for rBST-free milk. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Experimental Design 
 
In order to determine whether the presence of rBST stigmatizes milk to consumers, a 
three-part experiment was designed (see Table 1).  Part A consisted of rounds 
designed to familiarize participants with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)  
(1964) bidding mechanism, where induced “cash values” were used.  Advantages of 
the BDM mechanism for private goods include its incentive compatibility in an 
expected utility framework and demand revealing properties, making it ideal for this 
experiment.2  Part B also used the BDM mechanism and had subjects submit bids to 
purchase a pencil. Finally, Part C used the BDM mechanism to elicit WTP values for 
milk produced using three production techniques (conventional, rBST-free, and 
organic) and three fat contents (0% skim, 1% lowfat, and 3.25% whole). Experiment 
subjects were recruited via e-mail announcements to graduate student and staff e-mail 
list servers, as well as through PawprintFlash, an online publication containing 
articles, information, and announcements for Cornell University employees. Fifteen 
experiment sessions were conducted. Each session lasted approximately one hour and 
the average earnings were $15. 
For each part of the experiment, participants received written instructions3 with 
an oral explanation and were provided a chance to ask questions.  Subjects were seated 
                                                 
2 As pointed out by Karni and Safra (1987) and Horowitz (2006), the BDM in a private good context 
where the price is unknown may not be incentive compatible in cases outside of the expected utility 
model.  Their argument is also true with the alternative WTP elicitation mechanisms commonly used in 
experimental settings, such as the Vickrey auction and nth-price auctions.  The foundation of this 
research is based on the assumption of expected utility and the numerous experimental studies that have 
demonstrated the demand revealing characteristics of the BDM in induced value settings (i.e., Irwin et 
al. 1998; Messer et al. 2008). 
3 See Appendix 1 to view the experiment instructions. 
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Table 1: Experiment design 
 
randomly at computers that were equipped with privacy shields, and no 
communication was permitted between subjects.  Experiment data was collected using 
Excel spreadsheets programmed in Visual Basic.  At the completion of the 
experiment, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding their milk 
purchasing behavior and knowledge, their attitudes towards risk, and general 
demographic information.4 
 
3.1 Experiment Parts A and B: Understanding 
the Incentive Compatibility of the BDM 
Mechanism 
 
Part A consisted of five rounds. At the start of each round, t, participants were 
provided with a $5 initial balance, Yt, and were presented with a “cash value”, Vt, of 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 2 to view the post-experiment questionnaire 
Part Item for Sale 
Initial 
Balance 
Range 
of 
Costs 
Bids per 
Round 
Cash Payoff 
Rounds 
Exchange 
Rate 
A 
 
Cash Values: 
$1, $2.50, $4 
 
$5.00 $0.00-$4.99 1 5 2:1 
B 
 
Pencil 
 
$0.50 $0.00-$0.49 1 1 1:1 
C 
Quart of Milk 
 
Fat Types: 
0%, 1%, 3.25% 
 
Production Type: 
Conventional, rBST-
free, Organic 
$5.00 $0.00-$4.99 9 1 1:1 
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$1, $2.50, or $4 (see Table 1). Participants were then asked to record the highest 
amount that they would be willing to pay to receive that cash value—we refer to this 
amount as their “bid,” Bit. Once all participants recorded their bids, a price, Ct, was 
drawn from a random-number table containing values from $0 to $4.99 and announced 
to all the subjects.  
As described by Irwin et al. (1998), utility-maximizing subjects in this 
mechanism submit a bid given an initial income Y0 that maximizes: 
(1)   0 0
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
B E
B
EU p C U Y E V C dR p C U Y E dR= + + − + +∫ ∫  
Examination of the left side of equation (1) shows that it is not in the best interest of a 
participant to bid less than her actual WTP. In the event that the randomly drawn price 
falls between her actual WTP and her stated WTP, the participant loses the 
opportunity to earn a larger profit. The logic behind not overstating WTP is shown in 
the right side of equation (1). Participants would not want to submit bids that are 
greater than their actual WTP—if a participant bids higher than her actual WTP and 
the randomly selected price is between her actual WTP and her stated WTP, she could 
potentially end up paying more than her value for an object. The derivative of equation 
(1) with respect to B leads to: 
 (2)  0 0( )[ ( ) ( )] 0dEU p B U Y E V B U Y E
dB
= + + − − + =  
Since the probability of the bid being equal to the price is (p(B) > 0, participants who 
are maximizing their utilities will submit bids equal to value (B = V), demonstrating 
the incentive compatibility of the mechanism. 
Each round produced two possible outcomes for the participants that depended 
on their bids and the random price. If the participant’s bid was greater than or equal to 
the random price (Bit > Pt), the participant purchased the cash value at the randomly 
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selected price, yielding a payoff of Yt + πt – Pt. However, if the participant’s bid was 
less than the price (Bit < Pt), then the participant retained only the initial balance, Yt. 
The primary objective of Part A was to give subjects an opportunity to learn 
how the BDM mechanism operates. To this end, the procedures followed those of 
Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004); participants were informed that the best 
strategy for each round was to place a bid equal to the cash value (Bt = πt) since that 
would result in the participants receiving the greatest possible payoff for each round 
regardless of the price. To reinforce this message, at the conclusion of each round of 
Part A, participants were given the chance to view the bids from all of the subjects in 
the round, the random price, and the payoff outcomes. The bids were displayed on a 
screen at the front of the laboratory, listed in order from the lowest bid to the highest 
without identifying which participants had submitted each bid. The subjects could thus 
see how closely their strategies for bidding matched the optimal strategy that yielded 
the greatest possible earnings.   
Part B of the experiment served as a transition from Part A to Part C. In Part A, 
participants were asked to bid on an exogenously selected cash value, which for some 
can be a difficult concept to understand. Part B provided a bridge between  
Part A and Part C so that participants could accustom themselves to implementing the  
BDM mechanism with a real-world object for which each person had a unique,  
endogenously selected value. In Part B, participants were asked to bid on a  
Ticonderoga-brand pencil.  Part B consisted of a single round of bidding,  
participants were given an initial balance of $0.50, and they were asked to bid between  
$0 and $0.50 for a pencil. Once all of the bids had been submitted, a price between $0  
and $0.49 was determined using a new random-number table. As in Part A, if the bid  
was equal to or greater than the price, the participant received the pencil and its price  
was subtracted from her initial balance. If the bid was lower than the price, the  
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participant did not receive a pencil but retained the entire initial balance of $0.50. At  
the end of the round, pencils were handed out to participants whose bids were  
successful. 
 
3.2 Experiment Part C: WTP for Milk 
 
For Part C of the experiment, participants were given an initial balance of $5 and 
asked to submit bids ranging from $0 to $5 for nine different food items that would be 
presented sequentially.5  Participants were told that, after submitting bids for each of 
the nine food items, they would learn which item and corresponding bids would be 
used to determine the final payout. This selection would be done randomly so subjects 
were advised to submit bids for each food item as if it would be the one used to 
determine cash earnings. This type of experiment is commonly referred to as a within-
subject design as the same subject is asked multiple questions. An advantage of 
within-subject designs is that they allow for direct comparisons of how the a person 
views different types of products and information while also naturally controlling for a 
variety of individual-specific observable and unobservable elements, such as 
confusion about the operation of the bidding mechanism or experiment procedures. 
For instance, if a subject consistently submits bids that exceed her true WTP due to 
confusion about the BDM mechanism, a within-subject design helps control the 
                                                 
5 Unlike other experiments on food preferences, this design did not endow participants with a base 
product (such as conventional milk) and then assess their WTP for upgrading to another product, such 
as rBST-free milk. The endow-and-upgrade design was made popular by Shogren et al. (1994) but has 
been shown to affect WTP results in some experimental settings (Corrigan and Rousu 2006; Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). However, in the case of their review of endowment biases in BDM 
auctions, Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004) pointed out that providing an endowment does not 
significantly affect bids in the BDM mechanism (p. 404). In this design, the “upgrade” options were not 
defined, especially the differences in fat type where a consumer makes a trade-off between taste and fat 
intake preferences, so only a positive WTP for the products was elicited.  
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influence of this overbidding since it occurs for all of the products the participant 
considers. By analyzing the data with a mixed-model two-limit Tobit that clusters 
across the individual (as described later), this research further controls for errors 
resulting from receiving multiple observations from the same participant.  
The nine choices of milk in Part C were presented in three flights based on 
production type: conventional, rBST-free, and organic (see Table 1). For each flight of 
milk, participants were given a three-column taste-testing template, along with three 
five-ounce tasting cups, each filled with the same type of milk but varying by fat 
content—0% skim, 1% lowfat, and 3.25% whole. Participants were asked to taste each 
cup of milk and afterwards to answer two questions regarding the quality and 
freshness of each sample.6  The questions asked, on a scale of one to ten, how closely 
the taste of the milk matched the subjects’ expectations of fresh, high-quality milk and 
how well they liked the milk sample overall. The taste-testing questions were based on 
two hedonic milk studies in which experiment participants were asked to rate their 
level of “like” for milk, as well as rating the intensity of various milk characteristics 
(Chapman and Boor 2001; Chapman, Lawless, and Boor 2001). After answering the 
tasting questions, participants submitted bids representing the highest amount that they 
would pay for a one-quart carton of this type of milk.  
In the context of this research, it is of interest to compare how participants bid 
on the samples of milk with which they were presented in the experiment to how they 
would make a milk purchase decision in the real-world context of a grocery store. 
With the introduction of rBST-free milk in the marketplace, a typical milk consumer’s 
set of choices expanded from eight milk varieties (conventional or organic milk and 
0%, 1%, 2%, or 3.25% fat) to twelve. Our experiment design focused on recreating, as 
much as possible, the set of products a milk consumer would consider in making a 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 2 to view the taste-testing template. 
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purchase decision—in this case, nine milk varieties (conventional, rBST-free, or 
organic milk and 0%, 1%, and 3.25% fat)—and then asked the subjects to bid on milk 
produced using a given method in isolation, without considering their WTP for milk 
produced using the other two methods. While the ideal experimental design would be 
a perfect replication of the real-world milk purchase decision (Louviere 2006), this 
experimental design offers several advantages. First, the experiment is aided by the 
familiarity of the purchase decision since the adult participants in this study had made 
milk purchases repeatedly over many years and are accustomed to considering the 
purchase of milk at different prices (such as price differences commonly observed for 
different container sizes or whether the milk is purchased at a grocery store, shoppers 
club, or convenience store) and with different characteristics (such as 
organic/conventional production or flavored milk).  
Furthermore, to answer the question posed in this study, use of the BDM 
mechanism is superior to a dichotomous yes/no choice on a posted price (the setting 
most commonly found in marketplaces) because the BDM mechanism provides 
specific point estimates for a consumers’ WTP for different types of milk, something 
that would be very costly to do with dichotomous choice as the posted prices would 
have to be varied over a large range of possibilities, requiring a much larger sample 
size. Finally, these objective bids, along with questionnaire data and data regarding the 
order in which the different types of milk were presented, can be combined to analyze 
how the introduction of rBST-free milk into the market impacted consumers’ WTP for 
conventional milk.  
To mimic the information provided in a grocery store setting, subjects were 
given handouts containing nutrition and production information for each flight of 
milk. Importantly, the nutrition information differed only by fat type and not by 
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production technique.7  The information handout for rBST-free milk included a 
statement that the milk “does not contain artificial growth hormones” and the handout 
for organic milk included a statement that the milk was “produced without the use of 
antibiotics, synthetic growth hormones, or pesticides.” The wording for both 
statements came directly from the labels on the cartons of the original milks. The 
information sheet for conventional milk was labeled as “conventional milk” and did 
not make any claims regarding the production process. In the oral protocols, 
participants were informed that conventional milk was the type of milk most 
commonly available in grocery and convenience stores. To avoid any packaging or 
branding effect, all nine milks were served in clear pitchers and subjects did not see 
the brands of milk used in the experiment. 
Once all nine bids had been placed and the milk type selected, a price was 
drawn at random and the quarts of milk were distributed to those whose bids were 
successful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 3 to view the nutrition information handout. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
The experimental results from 148 adult subjects support the existence of a stigma 
effect from both organic and rBST-free milk on conventional milk. However, when 
looking at average WTP for milk of a given fat type, the stigma effect − especially the 
one from the introduction of milk labeled rBST-free − is initially difficult to detect. 
For example, as seen in Table 2a, participants’ average WTP was $1.03 for skim milk  
produced conventionally, $1.06 for skim milk produced without rBST, and $1.40 for 
skim milk produced using organic practices; the average tasting scores for these skim 
milks were 4.87, 4.87, and 6.18, respectively. The stigma effect becomes apparent  
when the average WTP values are separated by the order in which the milks were 
presented. The impact of the order of presentation is shown in Figure 1. Most notable 
is the decrease in overall WTP for conventional milk from when it was presented first 
to when it was presented last (Figure 1a). When conventional milk was the first 
 
Table 2: WTP and tasting values for milk by fat type and production method 
a) 0% and 1% Milk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0% Milk 1% Milk 
 
WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional $1.03 — $1.11 — 
rBST-free $1.06 +$0.03 $1.14 +$0.03 
Organic $1.40 +$0.37 $1.43 +$0.32 
 Tasting Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Tasting 
Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional 4.87 — 5.76 — 
rBST-free 4.87 0.00 5.56 –0.20 
Organic 6.18         +1.31 6.75 +0.99 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
b) 3.25% Milk and Overall Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
product presented, the average WTP offer was $1.28 (Table 3). However, when  
conventional milk was presented last (the third of three flights), the subjects were  
aware of the complete set of products, had the chance to taste all of them, and, much  
like in a grocery store, were presented with a wide variety of milk choices. In this  
case, average WTP values for conventional milk fell to $0.61 (a decline of 52.3%). On  
 
 
Table 3: Average WTP for milk by fat type, production method, and order of tasting 
 
Tasted First 
 
WTP 
Conventional 
WTP 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
WTP 
Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim $1.23 $1.03 –$0.20 $1.53 +$0.20 
1% Lowfat $1.37 $1.16 –$0.21 $1.39 +$0.02 
3.25% Whole $1.52 $1.24 –$0.28 $1.19 –$0.33 
All Fat Types $1.28 $1.05 –$0.23 $1.37 +$0.09 
 
Tasted Last 
 
WTP 
Conventional 
WTP 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
WTP 
Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim $0.55 $1.14 +$0.59 $1.32 +$0.77 
1% Lowfat $0.64 $1.22 +$0.58 $1.41 +$0.77 
3.25% Whole $0.63 $1.09 +$0.46 $1.34 +$0.71 
All Fat Types $0.61 $1.15 +$0.54 $1.36 +$0.75 
 3.25% Milk Overall 
 
WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional $1.04 — $1.06 — 
rBST-free $1.02 –$0.02 $1.08 +$0.02 
Organic $1.23 +$0.19 $1.35 +$0.29 
 Tasting Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Tasting 
Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional 5.60 — 5.41 — 
rBST-free 5.45 –0.15 5.30 –0.11 
Organic 6.26 +0.66 6.40 +0.99 
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a) Conventional Milk 
 
 
b) rBST-Free Milk 
 
c) Organic Milk 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of subjects willing to pay at a particular price, by the order the 
milks were presented 
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the other hand, the trend for rBST-free milk is different as the values generally  
increased (Figure 1b). When rBST-free milk was presented first, the mean WTP was  
$1.05; when the same milk was presented last, the mean WTP increased by 9.5% to  
$1.15. Organic milk saw essentially no change in WTP due to order, as mean WTP  
was $1.37 when presented first and $1.36 when presented last. 
While some of the decline in WTP for conventional milk may have been 
anticipated since the average tasting value for conventional milk dropped 15.9% from 
5.92 when presented first to 4.98 when presented last (Table 4), the decrease in 
perceived taste does not explain all of the decline. For example, rBST-free milk saw 
an even more dramatic decrease in its tasting value due to order—from 6.31 when 
presented first to 4.86 when presented last (a decline of 23.0%)—even though the 
WTP increased by 9.5%.8 
 
Table 4: Average tasting values for milk by fat type, production method, and order of 
tasting 
Tasted First 
 
 
Conventional 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional  Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim 5.47 6.00 +0.53 6.45 +0.98 
1% Lowfat 6.22 6.67 +0.45 6.57 +0.35 
3.25% Whole 6.07 6.26 +0.19 5.62 –0.45 
All Fat Types 5.92 6.31 +0.39 6.21 +0.29 
 
Tasted Last 
 Conventional 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim 4.43 4.19 –0.24 6.25 +1.82 
1% Lowfat 5.07 5.22 +0.15 6.93 +1.86 
3.25% Whole 5.43 5.16 –$0.27 6.45 +1.02 
All Fat Types 4.98 4.86 –0.10 6.54 +1.56 
                                                 
8 Not all of the tasting values declined with the introduction of additional milk products. For instance, 
the average taste values for organic milk increased from 6.21 when presented first to 6.54 when 
presented last. 
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A stigma effect is also potentially present when we pool together the subjects’ 
WTP for milk produced using all three techniques, effectively considering a single 
demand curve for conventionally produced, rBST-free, and organic milk. The mean 
WTP for all three milk types when conventional milk was presented first was $1.22; 
the mean WTP when conventional milk was presented third was $0.90 (the difference 
in mean WTP is statistically significant at the 1% level, (p = 0.0014)). This suggests 
that the introduction of milk labeled as being rBST-free or organic could have a much 
greater influence than simply reducing WTP for conventional milk—the availability of 
rBST-free and organic milk could reduce the demand for all types of milk. 
While the descriptive statistics and figures previously discussed are suggestive 
of a stigma effect, to evaluate formally whether this phenomenon is a result of the 
order, a detailed analysis of subjects’ WTP is necessary. Since participants in the 
experiments were asked to submit bids for multiple milks with varying fat types and 
these bids were constrained to between $0.00 and $5.00, we utilized a two-limit 
random-effect Tobit model. To evaluate whether there is a stigma effect from milk 
labeled as rBST-free and organic on conventional milk, the differences in WTP for 
milks with the same fat content were evaluated in three different models.9 
The models included dummy variables to indicate the fat content of the milk 
(FAT1 – 1% lowfat milk; FAT3 – 3.25% whole milk), whether the participant was the 
primary shopper in the household (PRIME_SHOP), whether the participant was aware 
of the availability of rBST-free (RBST_AVAIL) and organic milk (ORG_AVAIL) prior 
to the experiment, whether the participant was lactose intolerant (LACT_INT), and the 
participant’s gender (MALE). The participants responded to questions related to the 
                                                 
9 Censored bids (bids of $0 or $5) that did not differ between the milks with different labels were 
excluded from the analysis, since—given the censored nature of the data—the analysis could not 
determine whether there was truly a zero difference between the subjects’ WTP (or willingness to 
accept (WTA) in the case of censored bids of $0) for the milks or whether the change in real 
WTP/WTA occurred outside the range of observation. 
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frequency with which they purchased conventional (FREQ_CONV), rBST-free 
(FREQ_RBST), and organic milk (FREQ_ORG) and how risky they considered milk 
(MILK_RISK).10 Subjects also reported the number of children under ten in the 
household (CHU10), the highest level of education obtained (EDUC), and income 
(INCOME). As a control on the participants’ understanding of the BDM mechanism, a 
variable was included to represent their deviations from the final induced-value round 
during the first part of the experiment (BDM). Since a participant’s perceptions of the 
taste of a milk could have been influenced by the order in which presentation of the 
milks, a two-stage model was used that included estimated values for the differences 
in taste values (TASTE_RC, TASTE_OC, and TASTE_OR) as instrumental variables to 
avoid simultaneous-equation bias.11 
The average values for some of these variables offer insight into the 
demographic breakdown of the participants. For example, 83% identified themselves 
as the primary shopper for the household and household milk consumption averaged 
almost 1.5 gallons per week of mainly conventional milk. Awareness of organic-
labeled milk in the marketplace was much greater (92%) than was awareness of milk 
labeled as rBST-free (just 54%). The average participant attended some college 
without earning a degree and had an annual household income of slightly more than 
$57,000; 27% of households had children under the age of ten living at home. 
Most importantly for our analysis, a dummy variable was included to indicate 
the order in which the flights of milk were presented. Conventional milk was labeled 
as C, rBST-free milk as R, and organic milk as O. Thus, the order of presentation was 
indicated by the order of the letter code. For example, if rBST-free milk was presented 
                                                 
10 The value for the risk-preference variable is the mean of the answers to four questions regarding the 
participants’ attitudes towards the riskiness of pesticides, antibiotics, artificial hormones, and 
herbicides/fungicides—a higher number indicates a higher level of concern for a given risk factor. 
11 The explanatory variables in the analysis of the difference in taste variables were the same as those 
used in the general model except that the exact order of the presentation of the milk was also included. 
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before conventional milk, the dummy variable for the session was RC. Likewise, if 
organic milk was presented before conventional milk, that session was coded as OC. 
By setting up the models in this manner, we were able to isolate the effect of varying 
the order of presentation with the order variables—RC, OC, and OR—representing the 
size of the stigma effect and the coefficients on the other variables representing the 
price premium that participants with that particular attribute would pay for the 
alternative milk, ceteris paribus.  
Using these models, we were able to test three different hypotheses regarding 
how participants’ WTP for milk changes as the order in which they taste flights of 
milk is altered. The null hypothesis in each of the cases asserts that difference in WTP 
for the milk does not change as the order the flights are tasted changes, while the 
alternative hypothesis asserts that WTP for milk varies as the order changes. 
 
4.1 Difference in WTP Between rBST-Free and 
Conventional Milk 
 
As seen in column (1) of Table 5, the difference in WTP when rBST-free milk is 
presented before conventional milk (Model 1) shows that the marginal effect 
coefficient12 for the order dummy variable RC (0.351) is statistically significant (t = 
2.35, p = 0.019). Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that order does not affect WTP for 
rBST-free and conventional milk. The coefficient for RC indicates that participants are 
willing to pay $0.35 per quart less for conventional milk after tasting and being 
exposed to label information regarding rBST-free milk (i.e., rBST-free milk “does not 
contain any artificial growth hormones”).  
                                                 
12 Marginal effect coefficients deflate the Tobit coefficients so that we may directly examine the 
marginal effect of increasing a given dependent variable one unit. We cannot make this comparison 
with the normal Tobit coefficients. 
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Table 5: Two-limit, random-effect tobit model of differences between WTP 
  (1) rBST-Free -  (2) Organic - Conv. (3) Organic -  
  Conv.   rBST-Free 
Variable Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
CONSTANT -4.850** (-1.033) -2.448* (-1.011) 0.406 (-1.339) 
RC 0.351* (-0.149) 
    OC 
  
0.482** (-0.163) 
  OR 
    
0.024 (-0.165) 
TASTE_RC 0.125** (-0.032) 
    TASTE_OC 
  
0.051 (-0.062) 
  TASTE_OR 
    
0.009 (-0.063) 
FAT1 0.024 (-0.679) -0.029 (-0.084) -0.042 (-0.078) 
FAT3 0.019 (-0.072) -0.112 (-0.125) -0.112 (-0.096) 
FREQ_CONV 0.166* (-0.072) -0.029 (-0.079) -0.091 (-0.069) 
FREQ_RBST 0.201* (-0.090) 0.129 (-0.103) 0.122 (-0.110) 
FREQ_ORG 0.146 (-0.077) 0.011 (-0.074) -0.076 (-0.077) 
PRIME_SHOP 1.019*** (-0.296) 0.507 (-0.305) 0.277 (-0.300) 
RBST_AVAIL 0.256 (-0.153) 0.218 (-0.191) 0.087 (-0.171) 
ORG_AVAIL -0.334 (-0.238) -0.43 (-0.247) -0.497 (-0.283) 
MILK_RISK 0.078** (-0.027) 0.096** (-0.030) 0.079** (-0.031) 
MALE 0.393* (-0.172) 0.200 (-0.183) 0.133 (-0.187) 
CHU10 -0.063 (-0.106) -0.068 (-0.108) -0.098 (-0.111) 
EDUC 0.083* (-0.040) 0.058 (-0.055) -0.023 (-0.045) 
INCOME 3.01E-06 (-1.92E-06) -6.40E-07 (-1.97E-06) 3.04E-08 (-2.43E-06) 
BDM 0.394* (-0.161) 0.321 (-0.178) 0.157 (-0.177) 
LACT_INT 0.256 (-0.199) 0.111 (-0.223) -0.212 (-0.201) 
Log Likelihood –271.3 
 
–317.0 
 
–322.8 
 Wald χ2 65.74 
 
68.9 
 
25.01 
 Prob > chi2 0 
 
0 
 
0.095 
 # of Uncensored 282 
 
294 
 
294 
 # of Left- 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 censored 
      # of Right- 1 
 
3 
 
2 
 censored             
Note:  Significance is indicated by * for the 5% level and ** for 1% level or less.   
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 Several other variables besides the order dummy variable bear mentioning.  
The instrumental variable representing the difference in taste perception between 
rBST-free and conventional milk (TASTE_RC) is statistically significant, indicating 
the intuitive behavioral response that participants who thought that rBST-free milk of 
a given fat type tasted better than the conventional version of the same fat type were 
willing to pay more for it. Additionally, the more frequently a participant consumes 
either conventional or rBST-free milk (FREQ_CONV and FREQ_RBST), the larger 
the difference in WTP between rBST-free and conventional milk as both coefficients 
are positive and significant at the 0.05 level or better. Also, the coefficient on the 
variables related to whether the participant is the primary shopper (PRIME_SHOP) is 
large, a $1.11 difference for a quart of milk, and statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. This suggests that the household member who normally does the shopping is  
typically willing to pay more of a premium for rBST-free milk than those who do not. 
Importantly, these results imply that the stigma effect is not a phenomenon of naive 
and infrequent consumers but is something exhibited by experienced consumers of 
milk. 
Participants who expressed concern about the riskiness of milk (MILK_RISK) 
were willing to pay a higher premium for rBST-free milk, as were those who had more 
education (EDUC) and those who bid higher than the induced value in the last practice 
round of the BDM mechanism. 
 
4.2 Difference in WTP Between Organic and 
Conventional Milk 
 
Column (2) in Table 5 shows the results of the model that uses the difference in WTP 
for organic and conventional milk as the dependent variable. This model again shows 
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a stigma effect on WTP for conventional milk when it is presented after organic milk. 
In this case, the coefficient for the variable OR is even larger (0.482) and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level (p = 0.003). Thus, we can also reject the hypothesis that 
order does not affect WTP for organic and conventional milk. Subjects are willing to 
pay $0.48 per quart less for conventional milk after tasting and being exposed to label 
information regarding organic milk (i.e., organic milk “produced without the use of 
antibiotics, synthetic growth hormones, or pesticides”). The larger stigma effect of 
organic compared with rBST-free milk on conventional milk is intuitive since organic 
milk is free of more than rBST, having additional claims of being pesticide and 
antibiotic free. 
Additionally, the variable measuring the participants’ perceptions of the risks 
involved with consuming milk (MILK_RISK) was highly significant (p = 0.001) and 
had a positive coefficient (0.096). At the same time, several factors that are significant 
in the regression of WTP for rBST-free and conventional milk are not significant in 
this model. This could in part be driven by the higher level of preexisting information 
participants possessed regarding organic milk compared to rBST-free (92% were 
aware of organic milk while 54% were aware of rBST-free milk). Subjects who are 
willing to pay a high premium for organic milk likely are consumers who are already 
aware of its availability and reputation as a “safe” alternative to conventional milk. 
Hence, perception of the risks involved with consuming milk is a key factor in 
determining the price premium for organic milk. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
4.3 Difference in WTP Between Organic and 
rBST-Free Milk 
 
Column (3) in Table 5 shows the results of the model for the difference in WTP for 
organic and rBST-free milk, with no significant difference in WTP based on the order 
of presentation (OR). Thus, we fail to reject the hypothesis that order does not affect 
WTP for organic and rBST-free milk. It is important to note that rejection of the null 
hypothesis does not indicate that participants were willing to pay the same amount for 
organic and rBST-free milk, only that the difference in WTP was not caused by the 
order of presentation.  
The only variable that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level is the  
perception of milk risk (MILK_RISK), which had a positive coefficient (0.079). This 
indicates that participants view organic milk as a safer product than milk that is only 
rBST-free, likely due to the labels, which indicate that organic milk is produced 
without the use of antibiotics and pesticides. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
The economic implications of the stigmatization of goods have not been thoroughly 
examined in the literature. Producers of conventional items have frequently been 
concerned about the negative consequences that may result from the introduction of 
new, similar products with labels touting better production methods, such as bird-
friendly coffee, free-range chicken, sustainably harvested wood, and a variety of 
products marketed under the label of fair trade.  
In the dairy industry, the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), a 
synthetic version of a naturally occurring hormone, with milk-producing cows is an 
example of how stigma effects can have economic repercussions for the conventional 
product. The objective of this research was to determine whether the introduction of 
rBST-free and organic milk has a stigma effect on conventional milk. The question 
was addressed using experimental economics and by eliciting WTP measures from 
adult subjects for milk produced via different methods and varying in fat content. The 
advantage of using an experimental setting is the ability to observe directly the 
behavior of participants making actual purchase decisions as opposed to using survey 
techniques to pose hypothetical questions. The stigma effect was measured by altering 
the order in which participants were introduced to and asked to bid for the different 
types of milk. 
The results of this study of 148 adult subjects indicate a substantial stigma 
effect from both organic and rBST-free milk on conventional milk. To measure the 
stigma effect, differences in WTP for milks with the same fat content were evaluated 
in three different models. Using a two-limit random-effect Tobit model to control for 
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other factors affecting the difference in WTP, we find negative and statistically 
significant marginal effects for the coefficients on the variable measuring the stigma 
effect from organic on conventional milk and from rBST-free on conventional milk. 
Specifically, participants were willing to pay, on average, $0.35 per quart less for 
conventional milk after tasting and being exposed to information regarding rBST-free 
milk (i.e., rBST-free milk “does not contain any artificial growth hormones”). This 
represents a 33% reduction in WTP for conventional milk based on the overall average 
WTP in our study ($1.06 per quart). There was an even stronger stigma effect from 
organic milk; participants were willing to pay, on average, $0.48 per quarter less for 
conventional milk after tasting and being exposed to information regarding organic 
milk (i.e., organic milk “produced without the use of antibiotics, synthetic growth 
hormones, or pesticides”). This represents a 45% reduction in WTP for conventional 
milk.  
These results suggest that participants view conventional milk more negatively 
after the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk. This finding supports the idea 
that conventional milk becomes a stigmatized good after rBST-free and organic milk 
are introduced into the marketplace. 
These results also indicate that all milk types (conventional, rBST-free, and 
organic) are stigmatized by the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk. The mean 
WTP for all three milk types when conventional milk was presented first was $1.22; 
the mean WTP when conventional milk was presented third was $0.90. This $0.32 
difference (26%) was statistically significant at the 0.014 level. This finding suggests 
that the introduction of milk labeled as being rBST-free or organic could have a much 
greater influence than simply reducing WTP for conventional milk. That is, the 
introduction of rBST-free and organic milk could potentially reduce the demand for all 
types of milk. 
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A caveat on these results should be noted.  Our findings are based on 
observations from a laboratory experiment, which is not identical to real marketplace 
conditions.  In particular, the introduction of organic and rBST-Free milk products in 
the real market occurred gradually over a substantially longer time period than was 
modeled in our experiment. Given the rapid, sequential introduction of all three 
product types in our experiment, our results likely represent a short-term measurement 
of the stigma effect.  Further research into how long this stigma effect lasts is thus 
warranted.  
The experimental results illustrate that the recent actions by Wal-Mart, Dean 
Foods, and Starbucks to ban conventional milk and supply only rBST-free (and 
organic) milk may have significant negative consequences for conventional milk 
demand. The implication of the stigma effect found here is that the dairy industry will 
have to confront this issue head-on or risk a possibly major negative impact on milk 
consumption. 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Instructions – (Part A) 
Welcome to an experiment in the economics of decision making.  In the course of the 
experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money.  Any money earned during 
this experiment is yours to keep, thus please read these instructions carefully.  
Additionally, you are guaranteed a $5.00 show-up fee for participating, regardless of 
what you may earn during the experiment.  Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment.  As stated in the Consent Form, your participation 
in this experiment is voluntary.   
 
In today’s experiment, you will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you 
would pay for different purchase decisions.  We will refer to this amount as your bid.  
Sometimes a purchase decision will refer to a cash value and sometimes it will refer 
to a food item. 
 
For the first several purchase decisions, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
First, you will receive an initial balance of $5. You will then be informed of your 
cash value that you would receive if you purchase the decision.  Your cash values will 
vary during the course of the experiment.  The possible amounts are $1, $2.50, and $4. 
 
You will then be asked to indicate the highest amount that you would pay for this 
purchase decision.  For each decision, you can bid any amount between $0 and your 
initial balance of $5.  Once you have decided your bid, you will type it into the 
computer spreadsheet, hit ENTER on the keyboard, and then click the “Submit” 
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button.  After everyone has submitted their bids, the price for the purchase decision 
will be determined.  
 
The price will be determined by having a volunteer subject drop a pen onto a random 
number table.  Since these numbers have been generated by a random number table 
each price between $0.00 and $5.00 is equally likely.  Whether the decision is 
purchased depends on your bid and the randomly determined price.  There are two 
possible outcomes: 
 
The decision is PURCHASED: The decision is purchased if your bid is equal to or 
greater than the price.  In this case, you will receive the cash value in addition to 
your initial balance of $5.  However, you will also have to pay the randomly 
determined price.  Therefore, your earnings would be your initial balance, plus your 
cash value, minus the price. 
 
The decision is NOT PURCHASED: The decision is not purchased if your bid is 
less than the price.  In this case, you will not receive the cash value, but you will not 
have to pay the price.  Therefore, your earnings would simply be your initial balance 
of $5. 
 
In this setting, it is in your best interest (i.e. you will make the most possible earnings) 
if you submit bids equal to your cash value for the decision.  Note that while your bid 
helps determine whether the decision is purchased, your earnings are calculated based 
on your initial balance, the cash value and the determined price (not your bid).  For 
example, if a decision was not purchased and the cash value was $2.50 and the 
determined price was $4.50, your earnings would still be $5.  However, if the decision 
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was purchased with the same cash value and price, your earnings would be $3 (=$5 + 
$2.50 - $4.50).   
 
Example 1. 
Outcome Initial Balance  Cash Value  Price   Earnings 
Purchased              $5.00                         $2.50                   -$4.50                $3.00 
Not Purchased       $5.00                         $2.50                   -$4.50                $5.00 
 
Consider another example where the cash value was $5 and the determined price was 
$1.  In this example if the decision was not purchased your earnings would again be 
$5, while if the decision was purchased, your earnings would be $5.50 ($5 + $2.50 - 
$1). 
 
Example 2. 
Outcome           Initial Balance     Cash Value  Price   Earnings 
Purchased                $5.00                         $2.50                   -$1.00               $6.50 
Not Purchased         $5.00                         $2.50                   -$1.00               $5.00 
 
Calculation of Earnings 
After everyone has submitted their bids for the decision and the price has been 
determined, the administrator will display all of the bids on the screen in the front of 
the room.  These bids will be displayed anonymously from lowest to highest and no 
subject numbers will be associated with these bids.  The administrator will then ask all 
the participants the following questions: 
  
1)  Can you identify your bid? 
2)  Which subjects purchased the decision? 
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3)  How much will these subjects have to pay and how much will they earn in     
this round? 
4)  How much will the subjects who did not purchase the decision earn in this         
round? 
                                   
Then you will be asked to click the RECEIVE button and the computer will display 
whether you purchased the decision and calculate your earnings.  The computer will 
add your experimental earnings for all of the rounds, and convert this amount to US 
dollars by applying an exchange rate of 2 experimental dollars to $1 USD.  For 
example, if you earn 20 experimental dollars, your monetary payoff from this part of 
the experiment would be $10 USD. 
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Instructions - Part B 
 
Pencil as the Purchase Decision   
 
You will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you would pay for a pencil 
using the same procedures as discussed previously.  In this case, your starting balance 
will be $0.50 and you can submit any bid between $0 and $0.50.  The random price 
will again be determined using a random numbers table, however, now the price will 
range from $0.00 to $0.50.  In this part, there will not be an exchange rate as one 
experimental dollar will equal $1 USD.   
 
Note that in the case, you will need to determine the “highest amount” that you would 
pay to purchase this pencil.  Again, it is in your best interest to submit a bid equal to 
this highest amount, since, if you purchase the pencil, you will pay the randomly 
determined price not your bid.  The two possible outcomes are as follows: 
 
The pencil is PURCHASED: The pencil is purchased if your bid is equal to or 
greater than the price.  In this case, you will receive the pencil in addition to your 
initial balance of $0.50.  However, you will also have to pay the randomly determined 
price.   
 
The pencil is NOT PURCHASED: The pencil is not purchased if your bid is less 
than the price.  In this case, you will not receive the pencil, but you will not have to 
pay the price.  Therefore, your cash earnings would simply be $0.50. 
After everyone has submitted their bids and the price is determined, the administrators 
will distribute the pencils to the subjects which purchased them. 
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Instructions – (Part C) 
The procedures are similar to the ones used in Part B of the experiment, with some 
important differences. 
 
You will receive an initial balance of $5.  The purchase decision is one quart of milk.  
One quart of milk is equal to one-quarter gallon, or 32 fluid ounces.  The milk is cold 
and fresh and is being stored in the refrigerator in the lab.  
 
You will be making a total of nine purchase decisions regarding milk.  However, only 
one of the nine milk types will be selected for implementation and will result in cash 
earnings.  The type of milk that will be selected for implementation has been randomly 
determined prior to the experiment and this information has been placed in a dated, 
sealed envelope that will be opened at the end of the experiment.  Each of the milk 
types is equally likely to be implemented.  Therefore consider each decision as if it is 
the one that will be actually implemented. 
 
You will be served a series of three flights of milk that you will be invited to taste.  
Each flight of milk consists of three different milk types.  The milks will be placed a 
tasting sheet that provides information related to the milk you will be tasting. 
 
After sampling each milk type, please complete the questions related to the milk you 
tasted and then submit a bid for each of the milks.  Again, your bid should represent 
the highest amount that you would be willing to buy that one-quart of milk today.  You 
may bid any amount between $0 and $5 for each milk type. The price for the decision 
will be determined in the same manner as in Part A using a new random number table.   
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There are two possible outcomes: 
 
The milk is PURCHASED: The carton of milk is purchased if your bid is equal to 
or greater than the price.  In this case, you will receive the carton of milk in addition 
to your initial balance of $5.  However, you will also have to pay the randomly 
determined price.   
 
The milk is NOT PURCHASED: The carton of milk is not purchased if your bid 
is less than the price.  In this case, you will not receive the carton of milk, but you 
will not have to pay the price.  Therefore, your cash earnings would simply be $5. 
 
Please do not submit your bid until instructed by the administrator. 
 
In the event that the milk is purchased, you may either take it with you 
immediately, or store it in the lab until the end of the day.  Milk that is stored in 
the lab may be picked up between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. 
 
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
          Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
0%MILK (Skim) 
 
1)  Please rate how closely this product matches 
your expectation of fresh, high quality milk  
(1 = Worse than Expected; 5 = Meets 
Expectations; 10 = Better than Expected).   
 
Worse than                                   Better than       
Expected                                         Expected 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
2)  Please rate how much you like this product 
(from 1-10, with 10 being most favorable) 
 
   Least                     Most  
Favorable                  Favorable 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: TASTING 
 TEMPLATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1%MILK (Low Fat) 
 
1)  Please rate how closely this product matches 
your expectation of fresh, high quality milk  
(1 = Worse than Expected; 5 = Meets 
Expectations; 10 = Better than Expected).   
 
Worse than                                   Better than       
Expected                                         Expected 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
2)  Please rate how much you like this product 
(from 1-10, with 10 being most favorable) 
 
   Least                    Most  
Favorable                 Favorable 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.25%MILK (Whole) 
 
1)  Please rate how closely this product matches 
your expectation of fresh, high quality milk  
(1 = Worse than Expected; 5 = Meets 
Expectations; 10 = Better than Expected).   
 
Worse than                                  Better than       
Expected                                        Expected 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
2)  Please rate how much you like this product 
(from 1-10, with 10 being most favorable) 
 
   Least                    Most  
Favorable                              Favorable 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
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Nutrition Information: 0% Fat (Skim) 
 
Serving Size:   1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:   90 
Calories from Fat:  0 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:      0g     0% 
Saturated Fat:     0g     0% 
Trans Fat:   0g 
Cholesterol:  0-5mg     0-1% 
Sodium:   125mg         5% 
Carbohydrate:  11-13g     4% 
Dietary Fiber:  0g     0% 
Sugar:   11-12g  
Protein:   8g     16% 
Vitamin A:       10% 
Calcium:        30% 
Vitamin D:       25% 
Vitamin C:       2-4% 
Iron:        0% 
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: Fat Free Milk, Vitamin A Palmitate, 
Vitamin D3 added. 
 
APPENDIX 3: NUTRITION 
INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nutrition Information: 1% Fat (Lowfat) 
 
Serving Size:   1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:   100-110 
Calories from Fat: 20 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:      2-2.5g     3-4% 
Saturated Fat:      1-1.5g     5-8% 
Trans Fat:   0g 
Cholesterol:  10-15mg     3-4% 
Sodium:   125-130mg  5% 
Carbohydrate:  11-13g     4% 
Dietary Fiber:  0g     0% 
Sugar:   11-12g  
Protein:   8g     16% 
Vitamin A:       10% 
Calcium:       30% 
Vitamin D:       25% 
Vitamin C:       2-4% 
Iron:        0% 
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: 1% Lowfat Milk, Vitamin A Palmitate, 
Vitamin D3 added. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nutrition Information: 3.25% Fat (Whole)  
 
Serving Size:   1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:   150 
Calories from Fat:  70 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:      8g     12% 
Saturated Fat:      5g     25% 
Trans Fat:   0g 
Cholesterol:  30-35mg     10-11% 
Sodium:   120-125mg  5% 
Carbohydrate:  11-12g     4% 
Dietary Fiber:  0g     0% 
Sugar:   11-12g  
Protein:   8g     16% 
Vitamin A:       4-6% 
Calcium:        30% 
Vitamin D:       25% 
Vitamin C:       4% 
Iron:        0% 
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: Milk, Vitamin D3 added. 
 
 
 
Nutrition Information 
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APPENDIX 4: POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
 
  
Note: Please make sure to complete the questionnaire before leaving the lab. 
 
 
 
1. How thirsty were you during the experiment? 
   
Not Thirsty    1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9     Very Thirsty 
 
 
 
2. In the typical week, approximately how much milk does your household   
            consume? 
 
________________________ gallons    (1 quart = ¼ gallon) 
 
 
 
3. How often does your household drink:  
   
Conventional Milk: Never     Rarely     Sometimes     Often     Always 
 RBST-Free Milk:        Never     Rarely     Sometimes     Often     Always 
 Organic Milk:  Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often     Always 
 
 
4. Are you the primary shopper in your household?   Yes     No  
 
 
 
5. Including yourself, how many people live in your household?       
___________ people 
 
 
 
6. Including yourself, does anyone in your household have any milk allergies or 
lactose intolerance?         Yes         No 
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7. Before today, were you aware of the availability of rBST-Free milk? 
      Yes        No 
 
 
8. Before today, were you aware of the availability of organic milk? 
      Yes        No 
 
9. How concerned are you about the following in your milk? 
 
              Not Concerned                          Very Concerned 
Pesticides:           1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
Antibiotics:                1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
Artificial Hormones:    1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
Herbicides/Fungicides: 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
 
 
 
10. What is your country of origin?    U.S.    Other _____________ 
 
11. What is your gender?      Female    Male 
 
 
12. Do you have children?    Yes        No 
 If yes, how many children live at home?  ________________ 
 What are their ages?  __________________      
 
 
13. What is your highest level of education obtained? 
 
    Some High School        High School Degree        Some College 
    College Degree         Graduate Work       Other (please     
                                                                                                      list)_______________ 
 
 
14. What is your annual household income? 
 
    $0-$10,000                  $10,001-$20,000           $20,001-$30,000        
               $30,001-$40,000         $40,001-$50,000           $50,001-$60,000        
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               $60,001-$70,000           $70,001-$80,000          $80,001-$90,000       
               $90,001-100,000           $100,001-$110,000      $110,001-$120,000 
               $120,001-$130,000       $130,001-$140,000      $140,001-$150,000                 
               more than $150,000 
 
 
15. How risky do you consider drinking conventional milk? 
   
Not Risky   1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9   Very Risky 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Production labeling is a common approach for differentiating otherwise similar 
products in the marketplace.  While these labels may convey positive messages to 
consumers about the new product, they may simultaneously stigmatize the 
conventionally-produced product by highlighting perceived problems.  The net 
economic result for producers can be negative since consumers may decrease their 
willingness to pay for the conventional product that dominates the market, while the 
new product has a relatively small market share.  This research identifies this stigma 
effect in the case of milk, where the introduction of rBST-Free and organic milk 
reduces consumers’ willingness to purchase conventional milk. 
 In this thesis, the question of whether production labeling is driving 
consumer’s bias against conventional milk is investigated in an experimental setting 
by eliciting the willingness to pay in a sample of Cornell University staff and graduate 
students for milk produced via different production methods and of varying fat 
contents.  Through altering the order in which participants bid for the different types 
of milk and analyzing the resulting data using a two-limit random-effect Tobit model 
with instrumental variables, we find that consumers are indeed willing to pay a 
premium for rBST-Free and organic milk despite a lack of scientific evidence 
regarding harmful effects of rBST on human health. 
The results illustrate that, by varying the order in which experiment 
participants were allowed to taste and learn information about milk produced using 
different techniques, we are able to demonstrate that participants were willing to pay 
less for milk produced using rBST after being exposed to rBST-Free and organic milk, 
and likewise, willing to pay more for rBST-Free and organic milk after being exposed 
to milk produced using rBST.  In a situation where milk produced using all three 
techniques is available,  the end result is a higher price charged for rBST-Free and 
organic milk and decreased revenue for farmers and distributors who deal in milk 
produced using hormones.  The implications of the experiment are fairly 
straightforward – production labeling can indeed be a strong influence on consumer’s 
perception of a good, and producers of conventional goods in markets where 
alternative products are being introduced need to be aware of the potential impact of 
the availability of the new product on the demand for the conventional product.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Ideally, the labeling of products based on the production methods used should improve 
consumers’ welfare by offering more choices, while at the same time allow producers 
to differentiate their products and potentially secure additional profits from consumers 
who are willing to pay (WTP) more for a commodity produced with “preferable” 
methods.  However, labeling to promote the benefits of one technique may also cast 
the conventional commodity in a negative light.  For example, some dairy industry 
officials are troubled by the labeling of some milk as free of recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST), which is a synthetically produced version of the naturally 
occurring hormone bovine somatotropin (bST).  Dairy farmers use rBST to boost the 
milk yields of their dairy cows.  Some industry officials believe that labeling some 
milk products as “hormone free” will stigmatize conventionally produced milk 
resulting in a reduction in conventional milk or perhaps total fluid milk consumption.1  
In fact, several states have considered or are considering bans on milk labels that 
include phrases such as “hormone free” or “contains no artificial hormones” because 
of the potential stigma effect (Martin 2007). 
   In ex ante studies of the impact of rBST on consumers’ milk purchasing 
behavior, several factors were found that reduced the demand for milk produced by 
cows treated with rBST, including the amount of information about rBST that 
consumers possessed, the quantity of milk they consumed, and how much they were 
concerned with the level of milk prices (Kaiser, Scherer, and Barbano 1992).  This 
                                                 
1 In this article, conventional milk refers to the majority of milk sold in the marketplace, which is 
unlabeled and may or may not have been produced with rBST.  All organic milk and rbST-Free milk 
comes from farmers that pledge not to administer rbST to their cows 
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study confirms that, despite assurances from the Food and Drug Administration with 
respect to the safety of rBST for human consumption, consumers are not convinced 
that the use of rBST in the general fluid milk supply is in their best interests. 
 The question of the desirability of rBST for consumers has become even more 
relevant as large fluid milk processors and retailers, including Wal-Mart, Kroger, 
Dean Foods, and Starbucks have begun requiring suppliers to cease the use of rBST on 
their dairy herds.  Whether this decision was made with the interests of consumers in 
mind, or for some other reason, remains unclear.  What is clear, however, is 
consumers are moving away from purchasing conventionally produced milk and 
towards alternative products that are viewed as safer and more attractive, mainly 
organic milk and rBST-free milk. 
 A shift in consumers’ preferences away from conventional milk, which may or 
may not contain rBST, towards rBST-free alternatives is likely to have a significant 
impact on fluid milk producers. Estimates of rBST adoption rates in the United States 
vary significantly—from 15% in Wisconsin herds to as high as 44% in New York and 
Texas herds (Barham et al. 2004). According to Monsanto, the largest producer of 
rBST, 17% of dairy farmers nationwide used rBST to some degree on their herds and 
their herds accounted for 33% of the total number of dairy cows in the U.S. If fluid 
milk retailers and processors continue to push farmers to stop using rBST on their 
herds, there will likely be significant costs to the farmers as they transition back to 
dairy production techniques that do not utilize rBST (Forbes 2008). 
 In this research, the potential bias of consumers towards conventional milk is 
examined in the context of stigma, a psychological phenomenon in which an object 
becomes viewed in a negative manner even when no actual problem or health risk has 
been identified.  The problem is addressed using experimental economics and eliciting 
WTP for fluid milk produced via differing production methods and varying fat 
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contents from adult subjects. Through altering the order in which participants bid for 
the different types of milk, we find that consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
organic and/or rBST-free milk despite a lack of scientific evidence regarding harmful 
effects of conventional milk on human health, and hence it is likely that the trend 
towards rBST-free milk products is being driven by consumer preferences.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
Early research involving rBST was mainly concerned with how milk production 
would increase due to rBST adoption and the resulting implications for dairy policy 
(see, for example, Fallert et al. (1987); McGuckin and Ghosh (1989); and Tauer and 
Kaiser (1991)). While the supply-side effects of the introduction of rBST into dairy 
herds were well documented, the effects of introducing an unfamiliar biotechnology 
into a familiar good, were less well known.  A limited number of studies were done to 
gauge how consumers would react to the presence of rBST in their milk.  In a survey 
of consumers in New York and Virginia, 33% and 20 % of consumers, respectively, 
were concerned about the safety of rBST in their milk, and only 30% and 35%, 
respectively, believed that milk supplemented with rBST was safe to drink (McGuirk 
and Kaiser 1991).  Additionally, 85% of the respondents in both states believed that 
milk containing rBST should be labeled as such, the implication being that they were 
not fully convinced of the safety of rBST and would like the option of avoiding milk 
containing it if they so chose. Another study of consumer opinions regarding rBST 
found that, even taking into account reduced prices from rBST-induced milk 
production expansion, there would likely be a 1.6% decrease in milk consumption 
after the introduction of rBST (Kaiser, Scherer, and Barbano 1992). 
 The introduction of organic milk is the closest parallel to that of rBST-free 
milk.  While there has been much economic research on organic milk, little has been 
done on its potential stigma effect on conventional milk.  However, there has been 
some research regarding premiums that consumers are willing to pay for organic milk.  
Using scanner data and a hedonic econometric model, Bernard and Mathios (2005) 
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found that consumers were willing to pay premiums for both organic ($0.73 per 
gallon) and rBST-free ($0.26 per gallon) milk.  The higher price premium for organic 
milk implies that consumers are willing to pay more for the additional attributes that 
correspond with organic production.  Bernard and Bernard (in press) used 
experimental price auctions to decompose consumers’ WTP for various attributes of 
organic milk, with an emphasis on the rBST-free and the no antibiotic characteristics. 
They found that consumers place a significant value on both the rBST-free and the no 
antibiotics attributes of organic milk.  Dhar and Foltz (2005) used supermarket scanner 
data and a quadratic almost ideal demand systems model to examine the value 
consumers place on having organic and rBST-free milk in the market place in addition 
to conventional milk.  The authors found substantial benefits to consumers ($2.53 
billion) in terms of “competitive” and “variety” effects of having these two products in 
the market.  Based on previous research, therefore, it appears that consumers:  (1) 
prefer having a market that offers choice among conventional, organic, and rBST-free 
milk, and (2) are willing to pay significant premiums for organic milk, and somewhat 
smaller premiums for rBST-free milk compared with conventional milk.  Consumers’ 
reluctance to embrace rBST as a beneficial technology, as well as the presence of 
conflicting information regarding the safety of rBST in milk, also bears many 
similarities to consumers’ reactions to the use of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) and other biotechnology in food production (e.g., Noussair, Robin, and 
Ruffieux 2004; and Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroder 2004).  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
2.1 Stigma and its Influence on Consumer’s 
Perception of rBST-Free Milk 
 
It seems that consumers’ biases against GMO and rBST share many attributes. The 
question is why the bias against rBST persists. There is a plethora of information 
available regarding the safety of rBST and much of it is conflicting. A study of 
decision-making based on divergent risk information found that decision makers will 
put more weight on high-risk information than on low-risk information (Viscusi 
1997). Another study by Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002) on consumers’ reactions to 
food irradiation came to a similar conclusion-- consumers’ WTP for irradiated pork 
decreased more after exposure to negative information than it increased from exposure 
to positive information regarding the pork. Additionally, it seems that consumers are 
not adept at assessing food risks. In an experimental study of consumers’ WTP for 
increased food safety, participants were likely to rely more on personal experience 
than scientific information when determining their values for avoiding illness (Hayes 
et al. 1995). This could very well be occurring in the case of rBST. With the ease of 
acquiring information from the internet, it can be difficult for potential milk 
consumers to separate reliable information about rBST and human health risks from 
less reliable sources, especially since Canada, Japan, and a number of countries in 
Europe currently ban the use of rBST entirely. In a situation such as this, where there 
is conflicting risk information, consumers may put more weight on the high-risk 
information (or existing personal beliefs) than on the more reliable low-risk 
information and adjust their purchasing behavior accordingly.  
A topic related to the emphasis on high-risk information is the concept of 
stigma. Stigma can be thought of as “a negative feature that typically pervades and 
dominates an otherwise acceptable entity” (Rozin 2004). Stigma is passed on via 
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direct contact with a contaminated object in a phenomenon known as contagion 
(Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff 1986). Another key element of stigma, at least in 
Western societies, is that people tend to describe their feelings of revulsion for a 
stigmatized object in terms of how it impacts their health (as opposed to an object 
possessing some innate evil characteristic). The effects of stigma have been observed 
in a variety of economic situations such as the large decrease in home values near 
some toxic waste sites where the actual health risk posed by these sites in many cases 
has been relatively small and therefore objective risk alone cannot explain the 
consumer response (Messer et al. 2006; Dale et al. 1999; Adams and Cantor 2001; 
Guntermann 1995). Other examples of stigmatized products include cyanide in 
Tylenol bottles, exploding gas tanks that plagued the Ford Pinto, Firestone tire failures 
on the Ford Explorer, and mad cow disease with beef. 
Regarding the possible stigmatization of conventional milk by organic and 
rBST-free milk, the properties of contagion and medicalization of risk are especially 
salient.  Milk is considered a healthy, desirable food to consume until the milk 
undergoes contact with rBST via contagion, despite the lack of substantial chemical 
change in the milk.  People who see the addition of rBST to cows producing milk as a 
negative action tend to cite possible negative health consequences to humans and cows 
as justification for their views.  Both of these properties play into the possible role of 
production labeling in stigmatizing conventionally produced milk.  By distinguishing 
between conventionally produced and rBST-free milk through the use of labeling, 
milk retailers can potentially tap into consumers’ fears regarding the safety of 
conventionally produced milk in order to charge higher prices for rBST-free milk. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Experimental Design 
 
In order to determine whether the presence of rBST stigmatizes milk to consumers, a 
three-part experiment was designed (see Table 1).  Part A consisted of rounds 
designed to familiarize participants with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)  
(1964) bidding mechanism, where induced “cash values” were used.  Advantages of 
the BDM mechanism for private goods include its incentive compatibility in an 
expected utility framework and demand revealing properties, making it ideal for this 
experiment.2  Part B also used the BDM mechanism and had subjects submit bids to 
purchase a pencil. Finally, Part C used the BDM mechanism to elicit WTP values for 
milk produced using three production techniques (conventional, rBST-free, and 
organic) and three fat contents (0% skim, 1% lowfat, and 3.25% whole). Experiment 
subjects were recruited via e-mail announcements to graduate student and staff e-mail 
list servers, as well as through PawprintFlash, an online publication containing 
articles, information, and announcements for Cornell University employees. Fifteen 
experiment sessions were conducted. Each session lasted approximately one hour and 
the average earnings were $15. 
For each part of the experiment, participants received written instructions3 with 
an oral explanation and were provided a chance to ask questions.  Subjects were seated 
                                                 
2 As pointed out by Karni and Safra (1987) and Horowitz (2006), the BDM in a private good context 
where the price is unknown may not be incentive compatible in cases outside of the expected utility 
model.  Their argument is also true with the alternative WTP elicitation mechanisms commonly used in 
experimental settings, such as the Vickrey auction and nth-price auctions.  The foundation of this 
research is based on the assumption of expected utility and the numerous experimental studies that have 
demonstrated the demand revealing characteristics of the BDM in induced value settings (i.e., Irwin et 
al. 1998; Messer et al. 2008). 
3 See Appendix 1 to view the experiment instructions. 
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Table 1: Experiment design 
 
randomly at computers that were equipped with privacy shields, and no 
communication was permitted between subjects.  Experiment data was collected using 
Excel spreadsheets programmed in Visual Basic.  At the completion of the 
experiment, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding their milk 
purchasing behavior and knowledge, their attitudes towards risk, and general 
demographic information.4 
 
3.1 Experiment Parts A and B: Understanding 
the Incentive Compatibility of the BDM 
Mechanism 
 
Part A consisted of five rounds. At the start of each round, t, participants were 
provided with a $5 initial balance, Yt, and were presented with a “cash value”, Vt, of 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 2 to view the post-experiment questionnaire 
Part Item for Sale 
Initial 
Balance 
Range 
of 
Costs 
Bids per 
Round 
Cash Payoff 
Rounds 
Exchange 
Rate 
A 
 
Cash Values: 
$1, $2.50, $4 
 
$5.00 $0.00-$4.99 1 5 2:1 
B 
 
Pencil 
 
$0.50 $0.00-$0.49 1 1 1:1 
C 
Quart of Milk 
 
Fat Types: 
0%, 1%, 3.25% 
 
Production Type: 
Conventional, rBST-
free, Organic 
$5.00 $0.00-$4.99 9 1 1:1 
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$1, $2.50, or $4 (see Table 1). Participants were then asked to record the highest 
amount that they would be willing to pay to receive that cash value—we refer to this 
amount as their “bid,” Bit. Once all participants recorded their bids, a price, Ct, was 
drawn from a random-number table containing values from $0 to $4.99 and announced 
to all the subjects.  
As described by Irwin et al. (1998), utility-maximizing subjects in this 
mechanism submit a bid given an initial income Y0 that maximizes: 
(1)   0 0
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
B E
B
EU p C U Y E V C dR p C U Y E dR= + + − + +∫ ∫  
Examination of the left side of equation (1) shows that it is not in the best interest of a 
participant to bid less than her actual WTP. In the event that the randomly drawn price 
falls between her actual WTP and her stated WTP, the participant loses the 
opportunity to earn a larger profit. The logic behind not overstating WTP is shown in 
the right side of equation (1). Participants would not want to submit bids that are 
greater than their actual WTP—if a participant bids higher than her actual WTP and 
the randomly selected price is between her actual WTP and her stated WTP, she could 
potentially end up paying more than her value for an object. The derivative of equation 
(1) with respect to B leads to: 
 (2)  0 0( )[ ( ) ( )] 0dEU p B U Y E V B U Y E
dB
= + + − − + =  
Since the probability of the bid being equal to the price is (p(B) > 0, participants who 
are maximizing their utilities will submit bids equal to value (B = V), demonstrating 
the incentive compatibility of the mechanism. 
Each round produced two possible outcomes for the participants that depended 
on their bids and the random price. If the participant’s bid was greater than or equal to 
the random price (Bit > Pt), the participant purchased the cash value at the randomly 
11 
 
selected price, yielding a payoff of Yt + πt – Pt. However, if the participant’s bid was 
less than the price (Bit < Pt), then the participant retained only the initial balance, Yt. 
The primary objective of Part A was to give subjects an opportunity to learn 
how the BDM mechanism operates. To this end, the procedures followed those of 
Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004); participants were informed that the best 
strategy for each round was to place a bid equal to the cash value (Bt = πt) since that 
would result in the participants receiving the greatest possible payoff for each round 
regardless of the price. To reinforce this message, at the conclusion of each round of 
Part A, participants were given the chance to view the bids from all of the subjects in 
the round, the random price, and the payoff outcomes. The bids were displayed on a 
screen at the front of the laboratory, listed in order from the lowest bid to the highest 
without identifying which participants had submitted each bid. The subjects could thus 
see how closely their strategies for bidding matched the optimal strategy that yielded 
the greatest possible earnings.   
Part B of the experiment served as a transition from Part A to Part C. In Part A, 
participants were asked to bid on an exogenously selected cash value, which for some 
can be a difficult concept to understand. Part B provided a bridge between  
Part A and Part C so that participants could accustom themselves to implementing the  
BDM mechanism with a real-world object for which each person had a unique,  
endogenously selected value. In Part B, participants were asked to bid on a  
Ticonderoga-brand pencil.  Part B consisted of a single round of bidding,  
participants were given an initial balance of $0.50, and they were asked to bid between  
$0 and $0.50 for a pencil. Once all of the bids had been submitted, a price between $0  
and $0.49 was determined using a new random-number table. As in Part A, if the bid  
was equal to or greater than the price, the participant received the pencil and its price  
was subtracted from her initial balance. If the bid was lower than the price, the  
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participant did not receive a pencil but retained the entire initial balance of $0.50. At  
the end of the round, pencils were handed out to participants whose bids were  
successful. 
 
3.2 Experiment Part C: WTP for Milk 
 
For Part C of the experiment, participants were given an initial balance of $5 and 
asked to submit bids ranging from $0 to $5 for nine different food items that would be 
presented sequentially.5  Participants were told that, after submitting bids for each of 
the nine food items, they would learn which item and corresponding bids would be 
used to determine the final payout. This selection would be done randomly so subjects 
were advised to submit bids for each food item as if it would be the one used to 
determine cash earnings. This type of experiment is commonly referred to as a within-
subject design as the same subject is asked multiple questions. An advantage of 
within-subject designs is that they allow for direct comparisons of how the a person 
views different types of products and information while also naturally controlling for a 
variety of individual-specific observable and unobservable elements, such as 
confusion about the operation of the bidding mechanism or experiment procedures. 
For instance, if a subject consistently submits bids that exceed her true WTP due to 
confusion about the BDM mechanism, a within-subject design helps control the 
                                                 
5 Unlike other experiments on food preferences, this design did not endow participants with a base 
product (such as conventional milk) and then assess their WTP for upgrading to another product, such 
as rBST-free milk. The endow-and-upgrade design was made popular by Shogren et al. (1994) but has 
been shown to affect WTP results in some experimental settings (Corrigan and Rousu 2006; Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). However, in the case of their review of endowment biases in BDM 
auctions, Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004) pointed out that providing an endowment does not 
significantly affect bids in the BDM mechanism (p. 404). In this design, the “upgrade” options were not 
defined, especially the differences in fat type where a consumer makes a trade-off between taste and fat 
intake preferences, so only a positive WTP for the products was elicited.  
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influence of this overbidding since it occurs for all of the products the participant 
considers. By analyzing the data with a mixed-model two-limit Tobit that clusters 
across the individual (as described later), this research further controls for errors 
resulting from receiving multiple observations from the same participant.  
The nine choices of milk in Part C were presented in three flights based on 
production type: conventional, rBST-free, and organic (see Table 1). For each flight of 
milk, participants were given a three-column taste-testing template, along with three 
five-ounce tasting cups, each filled with the same type of milk but varying by fat 
content—0% skim, 1% lowfat, and 3.25% whole. Participants were asked to taste each 
cup of milk and afterwards to answer two questions regarding the quality and 
freshness of each sample.6  The questions asked, on a scale of one to ten, how closely 
the taste of the milk matched the subjects’ expectations of fresh, high-quality milk and 
how well they liked the milk sample overall. The taste-testing questions were based on 
two hedonic milk studies in which experiment participants were asked to rate their 
level of “like” for milk, as well as rating the intensity of various milk characteristics 
(Chapman and Boor 2001; Chapman, Lawless, and Boor 2001). After answering the 
tasting questions, participants submitted bids representing the highest amount that they 
would pay for a one-quart carton of this type of milk.  
In the context of this research, it is of interest to compare how participants bid 
on the samples of milk with which they were presented in the experiment to how they 
would make a milk purchase decision in the real-world context of a grocery store. 
With the introduction of rBST-free milk in the marketplace, a typical milk consumer’s 
set of choices expanded from eight milk varieties (conventional or organic milk and 
0%, 1%, 2%, or 3.25% fat) to twelve. Our experiment design focused on recreating, as 
much as possible, the set of products a milk consumer would consider in making a 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 2 to view the taste-testing template. 
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purchase decision—in this case, nine milk varieties (conventional, rBST-free, or 
organic milk and 0%, 1%, and 3.25% fat)—and then asked the subjects to bid on milk 
produced using a given method in isolation, without considering their WTP for milk 
produced using the other two methods. While the ideal experimental design would be 
a perfect replication of the real-world milk purchase decision (Louviere 2006), this 
experimental design offers several advantages. First, the experiment is aided by the 
familiarity of the purchase decision since the adult participants in this study had made 
milk purchases repeatedly over many years and are accustomed to considering the 
purchase of milk at different prices (such as price differences commonly observed for 
different container sizes or whether the milk is purchased at a grocery store, shoppers 
club, or convenience store) and with different characteristics (such as 
organic/conventional production or flavored milk).  
Furthermore, to answer the question posed in this study, use of the BDM 
mechanism is superior to a dichotomous yes/no choice on a posted price (the setting 
most commonly found in marketplaces) because the BDM mechanism provides 
specific point estimates for a consumers’ WTP for different types of milk, something 
that would be very costly to do with dichotomous choice as the posted prices would 
have to be varied over a large range of possibilities, requiring a much larger sample 
size. Finally, these objective bids, along with questionnaire data and data regarding the 
order in which the different types of milk were presented, can be combined to analyze 
how the introduction of rBST-free milk into the market impacted consumers’ WTP for 
conventional milk.  
To mimic the information provided in a grocery store setting, subjects were 
given handouts containing nutrition and production information for each flight of 
milk. Importantly, the nutrition information differed only by fat type and not by 
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production technique.7  The information handout for rBST-free milk included a 
statement that the milk “does not contain artificial growth hormones” and the handout 
for organic milk included a statement that the milk was “produced without the use of 
antibiotics, synthetic growth hormones, or pesticides.” The wording for both 
statements came directly from the labels on the cartons of the original milks. The 
information sheet for conventional milk was labeled as “conventional milk” and did 
not make any claims regarding the production process. In the oral protocols, 
participants were informed that conventional milk was the type of milk most 
commonly available in grocery and convenience stores. To avoid any packaging or 
branding effect, all nine milks were served in clear pitchers and subjects did not see 
the brands of milk used in the experiment. 
Once all nine bids had been placed and the milk type selected, a price was 
drawn at random and the quarts of milk were distributed to those whose bids were 
successful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 3 to view the nutrition information handout. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
The experimental results from 148 adult subjects support the existence of a stigma 
effect from both organic and rBST-free milk on conventional milk. However, when 
looking at average WTP for milk of a given fat type, the stigma effect − especially the 
one from the introduction of milk labeled rBST-free − is initially difficult to detect. 
For example, as seen in Table 2a, participants’ average WTP was $1.03 for skim milk  
produced conventionally, $1.06 for skim milk produced without rBST, and $1.40 for 
skim milk produced using organic practices; the average tasting scores for these skim 
milks were 4.87, 4.87, and 6.18, respectively. The stigma effect becomes apparent  
when the average WTP values are separated by the order in which the milks were 
presented. The impact of the order of presentation is shown in Figure 1. Most notable 
is the decrease in overall WTP for conventional milk from when it was presented first 
to when it was presented last (Figure 1a). When conventional milk was the first 
 
Table 2: WTP and tasting values for milk by fat type and production method 
a) 0% and 1% Milk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0% Milk 1% Milk 
 
WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional $1.03 — $1.11 — 
rBST-free $1.06 +$0.03 $1.14 +$0.03 
Organic $1.40 +$0.37 $1.43 +$0.32 
 Tasting Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Tasting 
Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional 4.87 — 5.76 — 
rBST-free 4.87 0.00 5.56 –0.20 
Organic 6.18         +1.31 6.75 +0.99 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
b) 3.25% Milk and Overall Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
product presented, the average WTP offer was $1.28 (Table 3). However, when  
conventional milk was presented last (the third of three flights), the subjects were  
aware of the complete set of products, had the chance to taste all of them, and, much  
like in a grocery store, were presented with a wide variety of milk choices. In this  
case, average WTP values for conventional milk fell to $0.61 (a decline of 52.3%). On  
 
 
Table 3: Average WTP for milk by fat type, production method, and order of tasting 
 
Tasted First 
 
WTP 
Conventional 
WTP 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
WTP 
Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim $1.23 $1.03 –$0.20 $1.53 +$0.20 
1% Lowfat $1.37 $1.16 –$0.21 $1.39 +$0.02 
3.25% Whole $1.52 $1.24 –$0.28 $1.19 –$0.33 
All Fat Types $1.28 $1.05 –$0.23 $1.37 +$0.09 
 
Tasted Last 
 
WTP 
Conventional 
WTP 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
WTP 
Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim $0.55 $1.14 +$0.59 $1.32 +$0.77 
1% Lowfat $0.64 $1.22 +$0.58 $1.41 +$0.77 
3.25% Whole $0.63 $1.09 +$0.46 $1.34 +$0.71 
All Fat Types $0.61 $1.15 +$0.54 $1.36 +$0.75 
 3.25% Milk Overall 
 
WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional WTP 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional $1.04 — $1.06 — 
rBST-free $1.02 –$0.02 $1.08 +$0.02 
Organic $1.23 +$0.19 $1.35 +$0.29 
 Tasting Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Tasting 
Score 
Difference from 
Conventional 
Conventional 5.60 — 5.41 — 
rBST-free 5.45 –0.15 5.30 –0.11 
Organic 6.26 +0.66 6.40 +0.99 
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a) Conventional Milk 
 
 
b) rBST-Free Milk 
 
c) Organic Milk 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of subjects willing to pay at a particular price, by the order the 
milks were presented 
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the other hand, the trend for rBST-free milk is different as the values generally  
increased (Figure 1b). When rBST-free milk was presented first, the mean WTP was  
$1.05; when the same milk was presented last, the mean WTP increased by 9.5% to  
$1.15. Organic milk saw essentially no change in WTP due to order, as mean WTP  
was $1.37 when presented first and $1.36 when presented last. 
While some of the decline in WTP for conventional milk may have been 
anticipated since the average tasting value for conventional milk dropped 15.9% from 
5.92 when presented first to 4.98 when presented last (Table 4), the decrease in 
perceived taste does not explain all of the decline. For example, rBST-free milk saw 
an even more dramatic decrease in its tasting value due to order—from 6.31 when 
presented first to 4.86 when presented last (a decline of 23.0%)—even though the 
WTP increased by 9.5%.8 
 
Table 4: Average tasting values for milk by fat type, production method, and order of 
tasting 
Tasted First 
 
 
Conventional 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional  Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim 5.47 6.00 +0.53 6.45 +0.98 
1% Lowfat 6.22 6.67 +0.45 6.57 +0.35 
3.25% Whole 6.07 6.26 +0.19 5.62 –0.45 
All Fat Types 5.92 6.31 +0.39 6.21 +0.29 
 
Tasted Last 
 Conventional 
rBST-
free 
Difference 
from 
Conventional Organic 
Difference 
from 
Conventional 
0% Skim 4.43 4.19 –0.24 6.25 +1.82 
1% Lowfat 5.07 5.22 +0.15 6.93 +1.86 
3.25% Whole 5.43 5.16 –$0.27 6.45 +1.02 
All Fat Types 4.98 4.86 –0.10 6.54 +1.56 
                                                 
8 Not all of the tasting values declined with the introduction of additional milk products. For instance, 
the average taste values for organic milk increased from 6.21 when presented first to 6.54 when 
presented last. 
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A stigma effect is also potentially present when we pool together the subjects’ 
WTP for milk produced using all three techniques, effectively considering a single 
demand curve for conventionally produced, rBST-free, and organic milk. The mean 
WTP for all three milk types when conventional milk was presented first was $1.22; 
the mean WTP when conventional milk was presented third was $0.90 (the difference 
in mean WTP is statistically significant at the 1% level, (p = 0.0014)). This suggests 
that the introduction of milk labeled as being rBST-free or organic could have a much 
greater influence than simply reducing WTP for conventional milk—the availability of 
rBST-free and organic milk could reduce the demand for all types of milk. 
While the descriptive statistics and figures previously discussed are suggestive 
of a stigma effect, to evaluate formally whether this phenomenon is a result of the 
order, a detailed analysis of subjects’ WTP is necessary. Since participants in the 
experiments were asked to submit bids for multiple milks with varying fat types and 
these bids were constrained to between $0.00 and $5.00, we utilized a two-limit 
random-effect Tobit model. To evaluate whether there is a stigma effect from milk 
labeled as rBST-free and organic on conventional milk, the differences in WTP for 
milks with the same fat content were evaluated in three different models.9 
The models included dummy variables to indicate the fat content of the milk 
(FAT1 – 1% lowfat milk; FAT3 – 3.25% whole milk), whether the participant was the 
primary shopper in the household (PRIME_SHOP), whether the participant was aware 
of the availability of rBST-free (RBST_AVAIL) and organic milk (ORG_AVAIL) prior 
to the experiment, whether the participant was lactose intolerant (LACT_INT), and the 
participant’s gender (MALE). The participants responded to questions related to the 
                                                 
9 Censored bids (bids of $0 or $5) that did not differ between the milks with different labels were 
excluded from the analysis, since—given the censored nature of the data—the analysis could not 
determine whether there was truly a zero difference between the subjects’ WTP (or willingness to 
accept (WTA) in the case of censored bids of $0) for the milks or whether the change in real 
WTP/WTA occurred outside the range of observation. 
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frequency with which they purchased conventional (FREQ_CONV), rBST-free 
(FREQ_RBST), and organic milk (FREQ_ORG) and how risky they considered milk 
(MILK_RISK).10 Subjects also reported the number of children under ten in the 
household (CHU10), the highest level of education obtained (EDUC), and income 
(INCOME). As a control on the participants’ understanding of the BDM mechanism, a 
variable was included to represent their deviations from the final induced-value round 
during the first part of the experiment (BDM). Since a participant’s perceptions of the 
taste of a milk could have been influenced by the order in which presentation of the 
milks, a two-stage model was used that included estimated values for the differences 
in taste values (TASTE_RC, TASTE_OC, and TASTE_OR) as instrumental variables to 
avoid simultaneous-equation bias.11 
The average values for some of these variables offer insight into the 
demographic breakdown of the participants. For example, 83% identified themselves 
as the primary shopper for the household and household milk consumption averaged 
almost 1.5 gallons per week of mainly conventional milk. Awareness of organic-
labeled milk in the marketplace was much greater (92%) than was awareness of milk 
labeled as rBST-free (just 54%). The average participant attended some college 
without earning a degree and had an annual household income of slightly more than 
$57,000; 27% of households had children under the age of ten living at home. 
Most importantly for our analysis, a dummy variable was included to indicate 
the order in which the flights of milk were presented. Conventional milk was labeled 
as C, rBST-free milk as R, and organic milk as O. Thus, the order of presentation was 
indicated by the order of the letter code. For example, if rBST-free milk was presented 
                                                 
10 The value for the risk-preference variable is the mean of the answers to four questions regarding the 
participants’ attitudes towards the riskiness of pesticides, antibiotics, artificial hormones, and 
herbicides/fungicides—a higher number indicates a higher level of concern for a given risk factor. 
11 The explanatory variables in the analysis of the difference in taste variables were the same as those 
used in the general model except that the exact order of the presentation of the milk was also included. 
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before conventional milk, the dummy variable for the session was RC. Likewise, if 
organic milk was presented before conventional milk, that session was coded as OC. 
By setting up the models in this manner, we were able to isolate the effect of varying 
the order of presentation with the order variables—RC, OC, and OR—representing the 
size of the stigma effect and the coefficients on the other variables representing the 
price premium that participants with that particular attribute would pay for the 
alternative milk, ceteris paribus.  
Using these models, we were able to test three different hypotheses regarding 
how participants’ WTP for milk changes as the order in which they taste flights of 
milk is altered. The null hypothesis in each of the cases asserts that difference in WTP 
for the milk does not change as the order the flights are tasted changes, while the 
alternative hypothesis asserts that WTP for milk varies as the order changes. 
 
4.1 Difference in WTP Between rBST-Free and 
Conventional Milk 
 
As seen in column (1) of Table 5, the difference in WTP when rBST-free milk is 
presented before conventional milk (Model 1) shows that the marginal effect 
coefficient12 for the order dummy variable RC (0.351) is statistically significant (t = 
2.35, p = 0.019). Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that order does not affect WTP for 
rBST-free and conventional milk. The coefficient for RC indicates that participants are 
willing to pay $0.35 per quart less for conventional milk after tasting and being 
exposed to label information regarding rBST-free milk (i.e., rBST-free milk “does not 
contain any artificial growth hormones”).  
                                                 
12 Marginal effect coefficients deflate the Tobit coefficients so that we may directly examine the 
marginal effect of increasing a given dependent variable one unit. We cannot make this comparison 
with the normal Tobit coefficients. 
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Table 5: Two-limit, random-effect tobit model of differences between WTP 
  (1) rBST-Free -  (2) Organic - Conv. (3) Organic -  
  Conv.   rBST-Free 
Variable Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
CONSTANT -4.850** (-1.033) -2.448* (-1.011) 0.406 (-1.339) 
RC 0.351* (-0.149) 
    OC 
  
0.482** (-0.163) 
  OR 
    
0.024 (-0.165) 
TASTE_RC 0.125** (-0.032) 
    TASTE_OC 
  
0.051 (-0.062) 
  TASTE_OR 
    
0.009 (-0.063) 
FAT1 0.024 (-0.679) -0.029 (-0.084) -0.042 (-0.078) 
FAT3 0.019 (-0.072) -0.112 (-0.125) -0.112 (-0.096) 
FREQ_CONV 0.166* (-0.072) -0.029 (-0.079) -0.091 (-0.069) 
FREQ_RBST 0.201* (-0.090) 0.129 (-0.103) 0.122 (-0.110) 
FREQ_ORG 0.146 (-0.077) 0.011 (-0.074) -0.076 (-0.077) 
PRIME_SHOP 1.019*** (-0.296) 0.507 (-0.305) 0.277 (-0.300) 
RBST_AVAIL 0.256 (-0.153) 0.218 (-0.191) 0.087 (-0.171) 
ORG_AVAIL -0.334 (-0.238) -0.43 (-0.247) -0.497 (-0.283) 
MILK_RISK 0.078** (-0.027) 0.096** (-0.030) 0.079** (-0.031) 
MALE 0.393* (-0.172) 0.200 (-0.183) 0.133 (-0.187) 
CHU10 -0.063 (-0.106) -0.068 (-0.108) -0.098 (-0.111) 
EDUC 0.083* (-0.040) 0.058 (-0.055) -0.023 (-0.045) 
INCOME 3.01E-06 (-1.92E-06) -6.40E-07 (-1.97E-06) 3.04E-08 (-2.43E-06) 
BDM 0.394* (-0.161) 0.321 (-0.178) 0.157 (-0.177) 
LACT_INT 0.256 (-0.199) 0.111 (-0.223) -0.212 (-0.201) 
Log Likelihood –271.3 
 
–317.0 
 
–322.8 
 Wald χ2 65.74 
 
68.9 
 
25.01 
 Prob > chi2 0 
 
0 
 
0.095 
 # of Uncensored 282 
 
294 
 
294 
 # of Left- 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 censored 
      # of Right- 1 
 
3 
 
2 
 censored             
Note:  Significance is indicated by * for the 5% level and ** for 1% level or less.   
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 Several other variables besides the order dummy variable bear mentioning.  
The instrumental variable representing the difference in taste perception between 
rBST-free and conventional milk (TASTE_RC) is statistically significant, indicating 
the intuitive behavioral response that participants who thought that rBST-free milk of 
a given fat type tasted better than the conventional version of the same fat type were 
willing to pay more for it. Additionally, the more frequently a participant consumes 
either conventional or rBST-free milk (FREQ_CONV and FREQ_RBST), the larger 
the difference in WTP between rBST-free and conventional milk as both coefficients 
are positive and significant at the 0.05 level or better. Also, the coefficient on the 
variables related to whether the participant is the primary shopper (PRIME_SHOP) is 
large, a $1.11 difference for a quart of milk, and statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. This suggests that the household member who normally does the shopping is  
typically willing to pay more of a premium for rBST-free milk than those who do not. 
Importantly, these results imply that the stigma effect is not a phenomenon of naive 
and infrequent consumers but is something exhibited by experienced consumers of 
milk. 
Participants who expressed concern about the riskiness of milk (MILK_RISK) 
were willing to pay a higher premium for rBST-free milk, as were those who had more 
education (EDUC) and those who bid higher than the induced value in the last practice 
round of the BDM mechanism. 
 
4.2 Difference in WTP Between Organic and 
Conventional Milk 
 
Column (2) in Table 5 shows the results of the model that uses the difference in WTP 
for organic and conventional milk as the dependent variable. This model again shows 
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a stigma effect on WTP for conventional milk when it is presented after organic milk. 
In this case, the coefficient for the variable OR is even larger (0.482) and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level (p = 0.003). Thus, we can also reject the hypothesis that 
order does not affect WTP for organic and conventional milk. Subjects are willing to 
pay $0.48 per quart less for conventional milk after tasting and being exposed to label 
information regarding organic milk (i.e., organic milk “produced without the use of 
antibiotics, synthetic growth hormones, or pesticides”). The larger stigma effect of 
organic compared with rBST-free milk on conventional milk is intuitive since organic 
milk is free of more than rBST, having additional claims of being pesticide and 
antibiotic free. 
Additionally, the variable measuring the participants’ perceptions of the risks 
involved with consuming milk (MILK_RISK) was highly significant (p = 0.001) and 
had a positive coefficient (0.096). At the same time, several factors that are significant 
in the regression of WTP for rBST-free and conventional milk are not significant in 
this model. This could in part be driven by the higher level of preexisting information 
participants possessed regarding organic milk compared to rBST-free (92% were 
aware of organic milk while 54% were aware of rBST-free milk). Subjects who are 
willing to pay a high premium for organic milk likely are consumers who are already 
aware of its availability and reputation as a “safe” alternative to conventional milk. 
Hence, perception of the risks involved with consuming milk is a key factor in 
determining the price premium for organic milk. 
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4.3 Difference in WTP Between Organic and 
rBST-Free Milk 
 
Column (3) in Table 5 shows the results of the model for the difference in WTP for 
organic and rBST-free milk, with no significant difference in WTP based on the order 
of presentation (OR). Thus, we fail to reject the hypothesis that order does not affect 
WTP for organic and rBST-free milk. It is important to note that rejection of the null 
hypothesis does not indicate that participants were willing to pay the same amount for 
organic and rBST-free milk, only that the difference in WTP was not caused by the 
order of presentation.  
The only variable that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level is the  
perception of milk risk (MILK_RISK), which had a positive coefficient (0.079). This 
indicates that participants view organic milk as a safer product than milk that is only 
rBST-free, likely due to the labels, which indicate that organic milk is produced 
without the use of antibiotics and pesticides. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
The economic implications of the stigmatization of goods have not been thoroughly 
examined in the literature. Producers of conventional items have frequently been 
concerned about the negative consequences that may result from the introduction of 
new, similar products with labels touting better production methods, such as bird-
friendly coffee, free-range chicken, sustainably harvested wood, and a variety of 
products marketed under the label of fair trade.  
In the dairy industry, the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), a 
synthetic version of a naturally occurring hormone, with milk-producing cows is an 
example of how stigma effects can have economic repercussions for the conventional 
product. The objective of this research was to determine whether the introduction of 
rBST-free and organic milk has a stigma effect on conventional milk. The question 
was addressed using experimental economics and by eliciting WTP measures from 
adult subjects for milk produced via different methods and varying in fat content. The 
advantage of using an experimental setting is the ability to observe directly the 
behavior of participants making actual purchase decisions as opposed to using survey 
techniques to pose hypothetical questions. The stigma effect was measured by altering 
the order in which participants were introduced to and asked to bid for the different 
types of milk. 
The results of this study of 148 adult subjects indicate a substantial stigma 
effect from both organic and rBST-free milk on conventional milk. To measure the 
stigma effect, differences in WTP for milks with the same fat content were evaluated 
in three different models. Using a two-limit random-effect Tobit model to control for 
28 
 
other factors affecting the difference in WTP, we find negative and statistically 
significant marginal effects for the coefficients on the variable measuring the stigma 
effect from organic on conventional milk and from rBST-free on conventional milk. 
Specifically, participants were willing to pay, on average, $0.35 per quart less for 
conventional milk after tasting and being exposed to information regarding rBST-free 
milk (i.e., rBST-free milk “does not contain any artificial growth hormones”). This 
represents a 33% reduction in WTP for conventional milk based on the overall average 
WTP in our study ($1.06 per quart). There was an even stronger stigma effect from 
organic milk; participants were willing to pay, on average, $0.48 per quarter less for 
conventional milk after tasting and being exposed to information regarding organic 
milk (i.e., organic milk “produced without the use of antibiotics, synthetic growth 
hormones, or pesticides”). This represents a 45% reduction in WTP for conventional 
milk.  
These results suggest that participants view conventional milk more negatively 
after the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk. This finding supports the idea 
that conventional milk becomes a stigmatized good after rBST-free and organic milk 
are introduced into the marketplace. 
These results also indicate that all milk types (conventional, rBST-free, and 
organic) are stigmatized by the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk. The mean 
WTP for all three milk types when conventional milk was presented first was $1.22; 
the mean WTP when conventional milk was presented third was $0.90. This $0.32 
difference (26%) was statistically significant at the 0.014 level. This finding suggests 
that the introduction of milk labeled as being rBST-free or organic could have a much 
greater influence than simply reducing WTP for conventional milk. That is, the 
introduction of rBST-free and organic milk could potentially reduce the demand for all 
types of milk. 
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A caveat on these results should be noted.  Our findings are based on 
observations from a laboratory experiment, which is not identical to real marketplace 
conditions.  In particular, the introduction of organic and rBST-Free milk products in 
the real market occurred gradually over a substantially longer time period than was 
modeled in our experiment. Given the rapid, sequential introduction of all three 
product types in our experiment, our results likely represent a short-term measurement 
of the stigma effect.  Further research into how long this stigma effect lasts is thus 
warranted.  
The experimental results illustrate that the recent actions by Wal-Mart, Dean 
Foods, and Starbucks to ban conventional milk and supply only rBST-free (and 
organic) milk may have significant negative consequences for conventional milk 
demand. The implication of the stigma effect found here is that the dairy industry will 
have to confront this issue head-on or risk a possibly major negative impact on milk 
consumption. 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Instructions – (Part A) 
Welcome to an experiment in the economics of decision making.  In the course of the 
experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money.  Any money earned during 
this experiment is yours to keep, thus please read these instructions carefully.  
Additionally, you are guaranteed a $5.00 show-up fee for participating, regardless of 
what you may earn during the experiment.  Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment.  As stated in the Consent Form, your participation 
in this experiment is voluntary.   
 
In today’s experiment, you will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you 
would pay for different purchase decisions.  We will refer to this amount as your bid.  
Sometimes a purchase decision will refer to a cash value and sometimes it will refer 
to a food item. 
 
For the first several purchase decisions, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
First, you will receive an initial balance of $5. You will then be informed of your 
cash value that you would receive if you purchase the decision.  Your cash values will 
vary during the course of the experiment.  The possible amounts are $1, $2.50, and $4. 
 
You will then be asked to indicate the highest amount that you would pay for this 
purchase decision.  For each decision, you can bid any amount between $0 and your 
initial balance of $5.  Once you have decided your bid, you will type it into the 
computer spreadsheet, hit ENTER on the keyboard, and then click the “Submit” 
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button.  After everyone has submitted their bids, the price for the purchase decision 
will be determined.  
 
The price will be determined by having a volunteer subject drop a pen onto a random 
number table.  Since these numbers have been generated by a random number table 
each price between $0.00 and $5.00 is equally likely.  Whether the decision is 
purchased depends on your bid and the randomly determined price.  There are two 
possible outcomes: 
 
The decision is PURCHASED: The decision is purchased if your bid is equal to or 
greater than the price.  In this case, you will receive the cash value in addition to 
your initial balance of $5.  However, you will also have to pay the randomly 
determined price.  Therefore, your earnings would be your initial balance, plus your 
cash value, minus the price. 
 
The decision is NOT PURCHASED: The decision is not purchased if your bid is 
less than the price.  In this case, you will not receive the cash value, but you will not 
have to pay the price.  Therefore, your earnings would simply be your initial balance 
of $5. 
 
In this setting, it is in your best interest (i.e. you will make the most possible earnings) 
if you submit bids equal to your cash value for the decision.  Note that while your bid 
helps determine whether the decision is purchased, your earnings are calculated based 
on your initial balance, the cash value and the determined price (not your bid).  For 
example, if a decision was not purchased and the cash value was $2.50 and the 
determined price was $4.50, your earnings would still be $5.  However, if the decision 
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was purchased with the same cash value and price, your earnings would be $3 (=$5 + 
$2.50 - $4.50).   
 
Example 1. 
Outcome Initial Balance  Cash Value  Price   Earnings 
Purchased              $5.00                         $2.50                   -$4.50                $3.00 
Not Purchased       $5.00                         $2.50                   -$4.50                $5.00 
 
Consider another example where the cash value was $5 and the determined price was 
$1.  In this example if the decision was not purchased your earnings would again be 
$5, while if the decision was purchased, your earnings would be $5.50 ($5 + $2.50 - 
$1). 
 
Example 2. 
Outcome           Initial Balance     Cash Value  Price   Earnings 
Purchased                $5.00                         $2.50                   -$1.00               $6.50 
Not Purchased         $5.00                         $2.50                   -$1.00               $5.00 
 
Calculation of Earnings 
After everyone has submitted their bids for the decision and the price has been 
determined, the administrator will display all of the bids on the screen in the front of 
the room.  These bids will be displayed anonymously from lowest to highest and no 
subject numbers will be associated with these bids.  The administrator will then ask all 
the participants the following questions: 
  
1)  Can you identify your bid? 
2)  Which subjects purchased the decision? 
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3)  How much will these subjects have to pay and how much will they earn in     
this round? 
4)  How much will the subjects who did not purchase the decision earn in this         
round? 
                                   
Then you will be asked to click the RECEIVE button and the computer will display 
whether you purchased the decision and calculate your earnings.  The computer will 
add your experimental earnings for all of the rounds, and convert this amount to US 
dollars by applying an exchange rate of 2 experimental dollars to $1 USD.  For 
example, if you earn 20 experimental dollars, your monetary payoff from this part of 
the experiment would be $10 USD. 
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Instructions - Part B 
 
Pencil as the Purchase Decision   
 
You will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you would pay for a pencil 
using the same procedures as discussed previously.  In this case, your starting balance 
will be $0.50 and you can submit any bid between $0 and $0.50.  The random price 
will again be determined using a random numbers table, however, now the price will 
range from $0.00 to $0.50.  In this part, there will not be an exchange rate as one 
experimental dollar will equal $1 USD.   
 
Note that in the case, you will need to determine the “highest amount” that you would 
pay to purchase this pencil.  Again, it is in your best interest to submit a bid equal to 
this highest amount, since, if you purchase the pencil, you will pay the randomly 
determined price not your bid.  The two possible outcomes are as follows: 
 
The pencil is PURCHASED: The pencil is purchased if your bid is equal to or 
greater than the price.  In this case, you will receive the pencil in addition to your 
initial balance of $0.50.  However, you will also have to pay the randomly determined 
price.   
 
The pencil is NOT PURCHASED: The pencil is not purchased if your bid is less 
than the price.  In this case, you will not receive the pencil, but you will not have to 
pay the price.  Therefore, your cash earnings would simply be $0.50. 
After everyone has submitted their bids and the price is determined, the administrators 
will distribute the pencils to the subjects which purchased them. 
35 
 
Instructions – (Part C) 
The procedures are similar to the ones used in Part B of the experiment, with some 
important differences. 
 
You will receive an initial balance of $5.  The purchase decision is one quart of milk.  
One quart of milk is equal to one-quarter gallon, or 32 fluid ounces.  The milk is cold 
and fresh and is being stored in the refrigerator in the lab.  
 
You will be making a total of nine purchase decisions regarding milk.  However, only 
one of the nine milk types will be selected for implementation and will result in cash 
earnings.  The type of milk that will be selected for implementation has been randomly 
determined prior to the experiment and this information has been placed in a dated, 
sealed envelope that will be opened at the end of the experiment.  Each of the milk 
types is equally likely to be implemented.  Therefore consider each decision as if it is 
the one that will be actually implemented. 
 
You will be served a series of three flights of milk that you will be invited to taste.  
Each flight of milk consists of three different milk types.  The milks will be placed a 
tasting sheet that provides information related to the milk you will be tasting. 
 
After sampling each milk type, please complete the questions related to the milk you 
tasted and then submit a bid for each of the milks.  Again, your bid should represent 
the highest amount that you would be willing to buy that one-quart of milk today.  You 
may bid any amount between $0 and $5 for each milk type. The price for the decision 
will be determined in the same manner as in Part A using a new random number table.   
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There are two possible outcomes: 
 
The milk is PURCHASED: The carton of milk is purchased if your bid is equal to 
or greater than the price.  In this case, you will receive the carton of milk in addition 
to your initial balance of $5.  However, you will also have to pay the randomly 
determined price.   
 
The milk is NOT PURCHASED: The carton of milk is not purchased if your bid 
is less than the price.  In this case, you will not receive the carton of milk, but you 
will not have to pay the price.  Therefore, your cash earnings would simply be $5. 
 
Please do not submit your bid until instructed by the administrator. 
 
In the event that the milk is purchased, you may either take it with you 
immediately, or store it in the lab until the end of the day.  Milk that is stored in 
the lab may be picked up between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. 
 
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
          Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
0%MILK (Skim) 
 
1)  Please rate how closely this product matches 
your expectation of fresh, high quality milk  
(1 = Worse than Expected; 5 = Meets 
Expectations; 10 = Better than Expected).   
 
Worse than                                   Better than       
Expected                                         Expected 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
2)  Please rate how much you like this product 
(from 1-10, with 10 being most favorable) 
 
   Least                     Most  
Favorable                  Favorable 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: TASTING 
 TEMPLATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1%MILK (Low Fat) 
 
1)  Please rate how closely this product matches 
your expectation of fresh, high quality milk  
(1 = Worse than Expected; 5 = Meets 
Expectations; 10 = Better than Expected).   
 
Worse than                                   Better than       
Expected                                         Expected 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
2)  Please rate how much you like this product 
(from 1-10, with 10 being most favorable) 
 
   Least                    Most  
Favorable                 Favorable 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.25%MILK (Whole) 
 
1)  Please rate how closely this product matches 
your expectation of fresh, high quality milk  
(1 = Worse than Expected; 5 = Meets 
Expectations; 10 = Better than Expected).   
 
Worse than                                  Better than       
Expected                                        Expected 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
2)  Please rate how much you like this product 
(from 1-10, with 10 being most favorable) 
 
   Least                    Most  
Favorable                              Favorable 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
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Nutrition Information: 0% Fat (Skim) 
 
Serving Size:   1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:   90 
Calories from Fat:  0 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:      0g     0% 
Saturated Fat:     0g     0% 
Trans Fat:   0g 
Cholesterol:  0-5mg     0-1% 
Sodium:   125mg         5% 
Carbohydrate:  11-13g     4% 
Dietary Fiber:  0g     0% 
Sugar:   11-12g  
Protein:   8g     16% 
Vitamin A:       10% 
Calcium:        30% 
Vitamin D:       25% 
Vitamin C:       2-4% 
Iron:        0% 
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: Fat Free Milk, Vitamin A Palmitate, 
Vitamin D3 added. 
 
APPENDIX 3: NUTRITION 
INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nutrition Information: 1% Fat (Lowfat) 
 
Serving Size:   1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:   100-110 
Calories from Fat: 20 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:      2-2.5g     3-4% 
Saturated Fat:      1-1.5g     5-8% 
Trans Fat:   0g 
Cholesterol:  10-15mg     3-4% 
Sodium:   125-130mg  5% 
Carbohydrate:  11-13g     4% 
Dietary Fiber:  0g     0% 
Sugar:   11-12g  
Protein:   8g     16% 
Vitamin A:       10% 
Calcium:       30% 
Vitamin D:       25% 
Vitamin C:       2-4% 
Iron:        0% 
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: 1% Lowfat Milk, Vitamin A Palmitate, 
Vitamin D3 added. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nutrition Information: 3.25% Fat (Whole)  
 
Serving Size:   1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:   150 
Calories from Fat:  70 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:      8g     12% 
Saturated Fat:      5g     25% 
Trans Fat:   0g 
Cholesterol:  30-35mg     10-11% 
Sodium:   120-125mg  5% 
Carbohydrate:  11-12g     4% 
Dietary Fiber:  0g     0% 
Sugar:   11-12g  
Protein:   8g     16% 
Vitamin A:       4-6% 
Calcium:        30% 
Vitamin D:       25% 
Vitamin C:       4% 
Iron:        0% 
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: Milk, Vitamin D3 added. 
 
 
 
Nutrition Information 
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APPENDIX 4: POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
 
  
Note: Please make sure to complete the questionnaire before leaving the lab. 
 
 
 
1. How thirsty were you during the experiment? 
   
Not Thirsty    1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9     Very Thirsty 
 
 
 
2. In the typical week, approximately how much milk does your household   
            consume? 
 
________________________ gallons    (1 quart = ¼ gallon) 
 
 
 
3. How often does your household drink:  
   
Conventional Milk: Never     Rarely     Sometimes     Often     Always 
 RBST-Free Milk:        Never     Rarely     Sometimes     Often     Always 
 Organic Milk:  Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often     Always 
 
 
4. Are you the primary shopper in your household?   Yes     No  
 
 
 
5. Including yourself, how many people live in your household?       
___________ people 
 
 
 
6. Including yourself, does anyone in your household have any milk allergies or 
lactose intolerance?         Yes         No 
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7. Before today, were you aware of the availability of rBST-Free milk? 
      Yes        No 
 
 
8. Before today, were you aware of the availability of organic milk? 
      Yes        No 
 
9. How concerned are you about the following in your milk? 
 
              Not Concerned                          Very Concerned 
Pesticides:           1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
Antibiotics:                1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
Artificial Hormones:    1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
Herbicides/Fungicides: 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
 
 
 
10. What is your country of origin?    U.S.    Other _____________ 
 
11. What is your gender?      Female    Male 
 
 
12. Do you have children?    Yes        No 
 If yes, how many children live at home?  ________________ 
 What are their ages?  __________________      
 
 
13. What is your highest level of education obtained? 
 
    Some High School        High School Degree        Some College 
    College Degree         Graduate Work       Other (please     
                                                                                                      list)_______________ 
 
 
14. What is your annual household income? 
 
    $0-$10,000                  $10,001-$20,000           $20,001-$30,000        
               $30,001-$40,000         $40,001-$50,000           $50,001-$60,000        
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               $60,001-$70,000           $70,001-$80,000          $80,001-$90,000       
               $90,001-100,000           $100,001-$110,000      $110,001-$120,000 
               $120,001-$130,000       $130,001-$140,000      $140,001-$150,000                 
               more than $150,000 
 
 
15. How risky do you consider drinking conventional milk? 
   
Not Risky   1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9   Very Risky 
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